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Abstract

AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF
ALTERNATIVES IN CHILDBIRTH

William K. Faber

This discussion concerns the ethical aspects of decisions regarding the various
options of place, attendant and method for the actual deliveiy of infants. It focuses on the

moral claims of childbearing women and fetuses and the roles of health care providers and
society at large during the brief, but significant, transitional period between the state of
pregnancy and the state of separate parent-child relations. The author's thesis is divided

into two major components. The first component is that certain alternatives to what has

become the typical U.S. childbirth experience are, under appropriate circumstances, safe
and provide benefits which justify their protection as childbirth options. This factual

conclusion, which has ethical significance,is based on literature review and a comparison
of the potential risks and benefits of each of a number of childbirth alternatives. The major
alternatives compared are home birth versus hospital birth, midwife attended versus

physician attended birth, and non-interventionistic versus technology assisted birth
techniques. The second component of the author's thesis is a philosophically reasoned
conclusion that prospective parents have a morally justified position as the final decision

makers with regard to options for their childbirth experience, with only two exceptions in
which their decision may be rightfully overridden. These two cases would be those in

which the parent was adequately established as incompetent and those in which positive
harm to the fetus/infant could be demonstrated. This conclusion is based on the author's

particular, expounded interpretation of the fundamental ethical motifs of beneficence,
autonomy and justice in relation to specific ethical issues of childbirth. The specific issues

discussed include: the value of the fetus, proxy representation, parental autonomy,child
abuse, the role of the state in parent-child conflicts of interest, and the role of physicians at
birth.
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Introduction

During the past one and a half decades a popular movement to change the American

childbirth experience has gained prominence. Scores of books and many articles in the lay
press have reflected public interest in making childbirth safer and more meaningful than it
was during the generation in which most of today's young mothers were bom.
Several factors and trends contributed to the rise of the "childbirth reform"

movement. In part, it was a reaction to the United States' poor world standing in jierinatal

(birth related) mortality statistics. In part, it was a reaction to the unsatisfactory personal
experiences many women had themselves had in childbirth. The general trend of medical
consumerism,in which individuals questioned and challenged the traditional wisdom of

medical practices and practitioners as never before, grew during these years. The women's
movement of this period also added impetus to childbirth reform, and several authors,
noting that the majority of birth attendants are men,framed the issue as one of male
dominance and control over women.

Trends within the field of medicine have also influenced the childbirth debate. One

of these was the vast increase in medical technology, much of which proliferated in areas
pertaining to childbirth. Physicians generally welcomed technological advances as means
to improve outcomes of childbirth and jierinatal statistics. Many childbirth consumer

groups, however, primarily saw the new technology as interfering with the meaningful,
human aspects of birth they wanted to maximize. Some felt the new technology posed as
many dangers as it obviated. Open hostility and conflict between consumer groups and

physician groups ensued. Consumer dissatisfaction contributed to the growing "liability
crisis" in which medical malpractice insurance rates skyrocketed, particularly for birth
attendants. Ironically,fear of litigation produced a defensive attitude in physicians, which

in turn has increased their incentive to utilize technology which they see as protective.

The open conflicts and debates of medical consumerism have brought about many
positive changes in the norms of American childbirth. Fathers are typically present in the
delivery room now,unlike in the past. Many hospitals now have "birthing rooms" which
provide more emotional warmth than traditional delivery rooms. The use of general
anesthesia and sedating drugs has sharply declined, and with this trend, chndbirth related
deaths have also declined. Yet there are many unresolved issues over which consumer
groups strive.

The issues of home birth and midwife attended birth are still hotly debated. These,
to many consumers, particularly those who see childbirth reform as part of the women's

rights movement, are at the core issue of the locus of control over childbirth. They ask:
Must a woman give up any control over the natural and very personal process of giving
birth to conform with hospital policies or physician interventions with which she may not
agree?" Many physicians, concerned with certain potential dangers of alternatives to

conventional hospital birth such as home and midwife attended birth, answer "Yes." They
justify themselves by a moral obligation to take no unnecessary chances with the life and
health of the mother and child. Opponents counter that physicians have an economic
conflict of interest influencing their assessment and maintain that it is not clear from
presently available evidence whether the risks of home birth and midwife attended birth
outweigh the risks of hospital and physician attended birth, at least in low-risk situations.
Legal and legislative battles have sigmficantly limited childbirth alternatives.

Midwives cannot practice their profession in many states and are severely restricted in
others. Malpractice insurance leaves a physician who attends a home birth without

protection. Such restriction of alternatives in childbirth may be supported legally, but is not
necessarily supported morally. We are left with the moral question of the locus of control
over childbirth and the dilemmas of those anticipating childbirth.

The discussion of alternatives in childbirth involves many ethical issues. The
illustrative question raised above regarding the locus of control over childbirth leads
directly to a classic discussion of the conflicts between the fundamental ethical motifs of

autonomy, beneficence and justice. (To what extent must the autonomy of a parent be
restricted by concern over beneficence to the child?) This specific discussion, however,

relates to many particular issues being debated currenfly in the field of ethics, including the
rights of children, patient autonomy,the regulation of health care, medical paternalism and
health resource allocation.

There are several levels on which the topic of alternatives in childbirth may be
analyzed. First, as with all ethical problems, we must ask factual questions. What are the

alternative settings, attendants and technical options possible for childbirth? Is one setting,
attendant or technique,in fact, safer than another? How is it determined that one option is

safer than another? How reliable are the data in question? These concerns for safety are
concerns of beneficence. Beneficence is the basic moral obligation to do good and prevent

harm.^ On this level of discussion, an attempt wiU be made to show which options are
beneficial to each party involved.

The second level of discussion must address the problem that a course of action

which is beneficial to one may not be beneficial to another. Physical safety is not the only
possible objective of doing good and preventing harm. Is not preventing pain doing good?
Some feel that childbirth options should be chosen to maximize the benefit of"bonding."
Who is to receive what benefit? This is the work of ethics. On this level, the various goals
and values we have regarding childbirth must be identified and weighed against one

another. The ethical principle ofjustice, which is concerned with the distribution of good,
will be discussed.

Thirdly, given that we could determine which childbirth alternatives produce the

best birth outcomes, should we force others to choose those alternatives, even when they

may philosophically disagree with what we mean by "best"? Are there reasonable limits to

the freedom of parents to obtain any birth experience they desire? Here we must address

the ethical problems in defining child abuse and society's role in intervening in parent-child
conflicts. Can we extrapolate our conclusions regarding intervention for child abuse after

birth to the time during and even before birth? The powerful ethical concem of autonomy
will be discussed.

It is my thesis that restrictions which make it difficult or impossible for prospective
parents to obtain the specific childbirth experience they desire are morally unjustifiable.

This thesis has two major components. The first component is the factual premise that

certain childbirth alternatives which have already been restricted, are, under appropriate

circumstances, comparable in safety to the standard, U.S. hospital childbirth experience
and may provide additional benefits. The second component is the philosophical premise
that, with two minor and carefully defined exceptions, prospective parents can be strongly
morally defended as the fmal decision makers in matters pertaining to their childbirth
experience. The two minor exceptions to the general defense of parental discretion in this
matter would be: adequately established incompetence of the decision maker and,
demonstrable intention to do positive harm to the fetus/infant

CHAPTER 1

ALTERNATIVE SETTINGS AND ATTENDANTS FOR BIRTH
BIRTH SETTINGS

There are four functional settings in which to give birth which will be considered

here. They are in the home,in an out-of-hospital birthing center, in an in-hospital birthing
center or birthing room,and in the conventional hospital labor and delivery department.
Home

For purposes of this discussion, let us refer to home birth as birth occurring
anywhere other than a clinic or hospital permanently equipped, and repeatedly used for the

delivery of infants. This could be any of a number of settings away from organized
medical care, though it is usually the home of the prospective parents. The term "home
birth should not be loosely used to imply who is in attendance or what facilities or

equipment are actually on the site at the time of delivery (non-permanently). These factors
are variable and should be addressed separately.

The primaiy risk of home birth is that facilities and personnel are not available for

emergency intervention should they be needed. Because certain complications of labor and

delivery can arise very unexpectedly, critics of home birth feel that birth should take place
immediately adjacent to an operating room for emergency C-section and where specialists
such as anesthesiologists, neonatologists and surgeons/obstetricians can be located. Home

birth increases the potential time between recognition of certain problems and intervention.
Minutes can make drastic differences in the successfulness of such interventions.

Benefits of home birth cited by its advocates^ include the belief that the familiar

surroundings of home have a calming effect on women in labor which may prevent certain

complications of labor encountered by women in the hospital setting. These potential

complications, namely increased pain and slowed labor, are thought to be related to

increased maternal anxiety.^ The home setting is also thought to enhance the psychological
benefits of the "bonding" process.4 Home birth obviates the anxiety of getting to the
hospital "in time," but not "too early." Home birth is also less expensive than birth in other
settings.^
Out-of-Hospital Birthing Center

Another setting for childbirth is the out-of-hospital birthing center. There are

several such freestanding centers across the U.S. which are permanently equipped and
repeatedly used for the delivery of infants, but which are not affiliated with hospitals.^

They attempt to provide a more homelike atmosphere than conventional hospital suites and
provide options not always available in hospitals. Such options might include attendance

by a midwife,foregoing electronic fetal monitoring, or allowing the entire family to be
present through birth. Freestanding birth centers are often very strict in their admission

screening criteria for low risk pregnancy.^

The risks offreestanding birth centers are similar to the risks of home birth settings,

due to the lack of immediate access to hospital facilities should an unforeseeable emergency
arise. These risks may be somewhat less than the similar risks of home birth, according to
the extent that the freestanding center has additional facilities and/or personnel to deal with
emergencies. Likewise, the benefits of freestanding birth centers are similar to the benefits

of the home birth setting, but likely lessened. Though freestanding birth centers may
provide flexibility and a large degree of parental control like home birth, they sttil involve
transport and separation from personal belongings.

In-Hospital Birthing Center

The third setting to be considered is in-hospital birthing centers or "birthing

rooms," which have proliferated under consumer demand. In this discussion,in-hospital
birthing centers are defined as cosmetically homelike birth settings within a hospital,

therefore providing immediate access to its technological facilities and personnel. Again,
there is variability between the practices and policies of in-hospital birth centers. Some

allow midwives to attend the delivery, some allow extended family members to be present

and some allow women to labor without an "I.V." or electronic monitor.8 Virtually all inhospital birthing centers screen for low risk pregnancy candidates.^

Several problems beset in-hospital birthing centers. First, they pose the same

problems of transport away from the surrounding of home that out-of-hospital birthing
centers pose. This may create some anxiety, although in-hospital birthing centers are

probably less anxiety producing than conventional hospital suites. Secondly, due to

hospital policies designed to limit its risk,"the 'alternative' aspects of alternative birthing
centers have been attenuated in many instances, so that they function more like regular
labor and delivery units."

If, for instance, hospital policy requires electronic fetal

monitoring in its birthing center, the presence of the monitor can serve as constant
counterinfluence to the illusion of homelike,"natural" childbirth.

The benefits of in-hospital birthing centers can be numerous. Whatever freedoms

hospital fiolicies wUl allow in this setting should tend to increase the satisfaction of the

laboring woman and decrease her anxiety. Bonding may be enhanced. And the possibility
of an unforeseen emergency is provided for. This assurance may even lower the laboring
woman's anxiety further.

Conventional Hospital Labor and Deliveiy Suite

The final birth setting that will be considered here is the conventional hospital labor

and delivery suite. There are considerable differences between hospitals, but most hospital
deliveries are still performed in rooms characterized by a lack of emotional warmth,

sterility, the presence of bright lights and technical equipment, and a firm deUveiy table

which facilitates positioning the laboring woman on her back with her legs held apart by
stirrups (the lithotomy position). Hospital births usually involve transfer of the woman

from a labor room bed to the delivery room table just prior to delivery. And hospital births
are almost always attended by a physician.

A significant hallmark of hospital labor and deliveiy is a body of policies which are
relatively inflexible and to which a person must agree to cooperate to gain admission.
Typical hospital policies might require a routine enema and prep (shave),electronic fetal

monitoring, only one visitor with a laboring patient at a time, only one person in the
delivery room with the patient, restricted activity, restricted oral intake, no choice of

delivery position, a mandatory "1.V." and significant period of separation of infant from
mother during the hour after delivery.

Most of these policies are related to the hospital's attempt to protect itselffrom

liability. The present legal climate makes the hospital responsible for the outcomes of labor

and delivery for a person who voluntarily signs in to be under its care. Naturally,if the
hospital is held responsible for the outcome of the birth, it will do what it can to control as
many variables as possible influencing that outcome. Hence the hallmark of control over

the labor and birth process via policies.

A general criticism of hospital birth regards this loss of control over what happens
to the pregnant woman's body and the very personal process of birth for which she feels

responsible. Hospital policy cannot be easily bent to treat different people differently and

to let people assume varying degrees of responsibility for the events of labor and delivery

(from those who would take no personal responsibility to those who would like to take
most of the responsibility).

Many specific criticisms of hospital birth are actually criticisms of individual

features of hospital birth. These criticisms will be considered individually in the portion of
this discussion entitled Techniques. At issue is the presence and quality of objective
evidence to justify many of the interventions cited above. Some traditional features of

hospital birth cannot be well supported by modem scholarship. Others appear to be
primarily for the convenience of the hospital and staff rather than strictly in the best interest
of the mother and child.

Perhaps the major risk of birth in conventional labor and delivery suites is that

unnecessary technology may be applied where it is not needed. Because technological
intervention and undue interference bring with them risks of their own, as will be shown

below, a low risk patient may be turned into a high risk patient if "routine" procedures are

indiscriminately applied.^ 1 As has been alluded to in previous discussion, critics of
hospital birth count the very presence of technological equipment and the disturbance of

multiple caregivers as risks which may have negative effects on the progress of labor by
increasing anxiety. Another risk of this setting is the increased probability of nosocomial
infection with particularly virulent pathogens not encountered in other settings.
Several statements can be made in defense of hospital labor and delivery
departments as setting for birth. The vast majority of births in the United States occur in

these departments with consistently good, and constantly improving, birth outcomes

despite the heterogeneity of the populations they serve. High risk pregnant women (for

whom the risks of non-intervention would exceed the risks of intervention) are logically
presumed to fare better in the hospital setting than they would outside it. And certainly,

there are occasional, unpredictable catastrophic events such as uterine rupture, eclampsia.

or massive maternal hemorrhage for which immediate access to hospital facilities can mean
the difference between life and death.

Discussion of Birth Settings

Strengths and criticisms of each of the settings described above have been given.
But which birth setting is actually safest? A physician, Lewis Mehl,13 proposed to answer

this question in 1976 by retrospectively studying 1,046 home deliveries in comparison to
1,046 hospital deliveries matched case by case for maternal age, parity (number of previous
pregnancies) and many other factors. He found no statistically significant difference in

perinatal mortality rates between the groups. His study suffers from the problems of aU
retrospective studies, such as possible bias involved in the selection of the control cases,

yet it is the largest and only matched study comparing the two groups to date.
Not all home births are alike. Many are unplanned or poorly planned. Consumer

groups who advocate home birth do not endorse home birth without an appropriate

attendant or advance preparation.14 The following results, reported in a 1980 issue of the
Journal of the American Medical Association, illustrate the difference in outcomes

according to the circumstances of home birth. The article reported findings in North

Carolina home births. In home births involving low-risk mothers and attended by
midwives, there was a 3 in 1,000 neonatal mortality rate. But in planned home births
without a professional attendant the neonatal mortality rate climbed to 30 in 1,000. In
unplanned home births, the rate was 150 in 1,000.15

Recently, Gerard Hoff and Lawrence Schneiderman,16 also physicians, tried to

determine the relative safety of home versus hospital births by a different method. They
posit the case of a woman appropriately screened for home birth (low risk) with a

competent attendant. They reason that the only added risk of mortality from delivering at

home under those circumstances would be the risk of a correctable fatal event arising

during labor which the birth attendant could not effectively correct before the woman could
be transferred to a hospital. If a theoretical complication was uncorrectable,even in the

hospital, it could not be counted as an additional risk of home birth. Likewise they
discounted events which occur prior to the time that even women planning hospital births
would go to the hospital.

By compounding percentages generally accepted in obstetric literature for such
possible complications, they arrive at what they consider to be a conservative estimate of

"the added risk of perinatal death directly attributable to home birth." They calculate this

risk to be "no more than 1 in 1,000."^^ What Hoff and Schneiderman did not attempt to
estimate was "the added risk of perinatal death directly attributable to hospital birth" for low
risk women when compared to their counterparts at home. One must consider the risks of
nosocomial infection with resistant organisms not encountered in the home, and the

increased number of people involved in the case who could each make a mistake (as with
medication). One must consider the distraction of attendants by others in labor and

complications arising from surgical techniques and medications typically absent from home

buths. When these and other risks of hospital birth are compounded, it is possible that this
overall risk may be of a similar magnitude (1 in 1,000).
BIRTH ATTENDANTS

Midwives

Historically, the first and oldest group of birth attendants by far are midwives.

They are mentioned in the earliest passages of BibUcal histoiy.18 They traditionally
learned by experience in helping other midwives,apprentice style, how to be of assistance

to a laboring woman.19 They held a special role in primitive societies and stiU assist

women in many cultures. For purposes of this discussion, we will recognize two kinds of
midwives: the lay midwife and the Certified Nurse Midwife.

Lay midwives of the type described above, who have learned their skiUs

experientially and who lack formal training still exist in scattered rural locations throughout

the United States. Their techniques wary. Many have some formal training, but though
their qualifications probably vary widely, here they will be grouped as lay midwives unless
they have passed the certification exam. Other names for these birth attendants include

granny midwives, empirical midwives,and direct entry midwives. Lay midwives are

currently legally allowed to practice in ten states.20 a few other states have lay midwife
licensing procedures, but refuse to issue licenses, or cannot for various reasons, such as a

licensing statute which requires attendance at a school which has not yet been
established.21

Certified Nurse Midwives must complete a bachelors degree and become registered
nurses before they can enter a one or two year midwifery training course. They may then

take the certification exam.22 Despite their formal education and this nationally recognized
standard of competency. Certified Nurse Midwives have had a difficult time carving out a
niche in which to practice their profession. They have been limited by the practical
considerations of licensing restrictions, failure to be recognized by third party payers,
exclusion from hospital staffs, difficulty finding a physician willing to provide "back-up"
coverage and lawsuits charging that they "practice medicine without a license."23

Recently, they have been greatly hampered by inability to find carriers who will provide
them with malpractice insurance coverage.24

Midwives differ from physicians not only in the scope of their training but in their

techniques and philosophies. Following a long tradition within midwifery, they stress

non-interventionism. They view birth as a natural, non-pathological event which typically
does not require medical intervention or management(hence they feel that they are not

practicing medicine" without a license).25 They emphasize continuity and support for the
pregnant woman,typically remaining with her for her entire labor as well as the delivery.26

They do not use drugs and rarely use a surgical technique except in cases where they are

directed to do so by a physician having responsibility over them. Midwives differ amongst
themselves on many issues, but they generally agree on their role of assisting, rather than
controlling or managing, a woman in her labor and delivery.
Certified Nurse Midwives(and many other midwives) are trained to screen mothers

for pathological conditions and purpose to deliver only "low risk," or physiologically

normal, candidates.27 They refer "high risk," or pathological cases to physicians
whenever possible. Midwives also stress preparedness for childbirth, including proper

nutrition, exercise and intensive education, and so spend much of their time teaching.28
Physicians

Physicians have attended over 98% of births in the United States since 1970.29

Their training also varies widely. A physician is simply defined here as a person licensed
to practice medicine. That licensing requires that a person graduate from a recognized
medical school, that he or she pass the National or State Board or FLEX examination, and

that he or she satisfactorily complete a year of supervised practice (intemship). U.S.
medical schools typically require three months'training in obstetrics and the year of
intemship may contain none at all. Therefore, it is possible to be a licensed physician and
have only three months of training in obstetrics. Today's family practitioner has three or

four months of required obstetrical training in residency, and so may practice with a total
(medical school plus residency)of six or seven months of training in obstetrics.^^
Obstetrician-gynecologists must complete a four year training course after medical

school to become certified by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(AGOG). This certification is required at most U.S. hospitals now to obtain privileges to

perform Cesarean sections. About half of the obstetrics and gynecology residency is
devoted to obstetrical training, per se-the other focuses on medical and surgical problems

of women other than those pertaining to pregnancy and birth.31 Further training, a two
year fellowship in matemal-fetal medicine, is now available for those who wish to study
obstetrics specifically.

Physicians disagree with one another over the appropriateness and efficacy of
specific techniques. They also differ in philosophy from one another. But there are some

common features of physician attended birth. There are very few^^ physicians who will

attend home births. Physicians commonly use drug therapy and surgical techniques as

adjuncts to their obstetric care. Physicians may also, due to a heightened sense of liability
and pierhaps in part due to habit, tend to take control of the labor and birth process to assure
a result for which they feel responsible. T^e phrase "managing labor" is common parlance

between physicians and does not seem to strike them as inappropriate. Yet physicians are
rarely present with their patients throughout all of labor.
Discussion of Birth Attendants

One conclusion from the foregoing description of birth attendants is that there are

not merely two homogenous group(midwives and physicians) struggling over the care of
pregnant women. There is a continuum of training available ranging from mountain
"granny" midwives to the obstetrical subspecialists of tertiary care centers. Within the

ranks of physicians, obstetricians contend with family practitioners over competence to

deliver babies and hospital privileges to do so.33 in terms of months of formal training in
obstetrics. Certified Nurse Midwives may surpass many general and family practitioners
who enjoy the freedom to still deliver approximately 20% of the children bom in the U.S.
today.34

It is apparent that not evei^one who attends birth can possess the maximal level of

formal education on the subject Neither can those with the highest level of training be
available to everyone. There are areas and populations those with higher training will not
serve. Furthermore, there are many skills which no amount of formal education will teach

as well as experience. The knowledge and skills of a "granny" midwife, though
academically flawed, may prove welcomed benefit to a totally ignorant woman in a remote
setting.

Do birth outcomes improve, that is, does birth related morbidity and mortality
decrease, as the level offormal education possessed by the birth attendant increases? One
might casually reason so, but such is not necessarily the case. Let us consider the statistics
of midwives in the U.S.

Nurse-midwives in Madera County, California,funded to practice there from 1960

to 1963, achieved better neonatal mortality rates (10.3 per thousand)than either the general
practitioners who preceded them (23.9 per thousand) or the board certified obstetricians

who replaced them (32.0 per thousand).35 All three groups practiced out of the same

hospital and served the same population. Likewise, the Frontier Nursing Service, utilizing
midwives in an isolated region of eastern Kentucky since 1925, has each year had lower
maternal and neonatal death rates than either Kentucky or the U.S. as a whole, despite
serving a population of higher than average risk.36

Midwives of the Catholic Maternity Institute of Santa Fe, New Mexico steadily

lowered the perinatal mortality rates^? of Santa Fee County from 87.6 per thousand in
1939(before they started there) to 15.1 per thousand in 1967. In 1967 the perinatal
mortality rate of the U.S. as a whole was 22.1 per thousand, and New Mexico's rate was

even higher.38 At Su Chnica Familiar in Raymondville, Texas, midwives in an out-ofhospital birthing center in 1,412 births during the years 1972 to 1979 had a neonatal
mortality rate of 4.0 per thousand and no maternal deaths.39

The North Central Bronx Hospital, serving a population of more than 30% high
risk mothers,operates a physician-midwife team maternity service where every laboring
mother is cared for by a midwife and 83% are actually delivered by a midwife. Their
neonatal mortality rate for 1979,in 2,608 births, was 4.2 per thousand, which bettered that
year's statistics for New York City, New York State and the U.S. as a whole. There were
no maternal deaths.'^O

Even the lay midwives (albeit well trained, not formally educated in nursing nor

certified) of The Farm, a "spiritual community" near Summertown,Tennessee, produced
lower perinatal mortality statistics than Tennessee or the U.S. as a whole during the period
1970-1979. There were no maternal deaths during those years, which encompassed The
Farm's first 1,000 births.^l

It is important in comparing birth related statistics to recognize significant

differences between mothers delivered by midwives and those delivered by physicians.
Midwives as a group attempt to screen pathological cases from their practices. Physicians
as a group must "pick-up" those pathological cases and include the outcomes in their

statistical profile. As pathology in pregnancy increases, negative birth outcomes increase

(many unavoidably and independent of attendant skill). It is not unreasonable, therefore,
that specialists to whom are referred the cases of worst pathology may also have the worst

statistical profiles. Many poor outcomes result from pregnant women who present
themselves at the time of delivery with no prenatal care through no fault of the physician.
Both lay midwives and Certified Nurse midwives have produced noteworthy safety
records in a number of settings. Part of their success can reasonably be attributed to thenscreening techniques. Due to this screening, however, these statistics must stand alone

when we evaluate the "safety" of midwives. These statistics cannot be compared with
those of physicians who do not screen their populations. It is truly a guess whether

physicians as a group would have produced better statistics in the same settings. To truly

compare the skills of midwives with physicians, we need studies which show their results
with similar populations. No such studies were found.

It is interesting to note, however, that midwives have been able to generate

favorable statistics, despite, in many cases, serving high risk populations. The examples
cited above reveal some characteristics of the focal geographical areas where midwifery still
survives today. These areas are usuaUy isolated from hospitals or have not been able to

attract physician services. The people are often veiy poor and uneducated. Proverty and

ignorance lead to undernourishment and disease which make pregnancies in these places
high risk. Though midwives would prefer to limit themselves to low risk cases, they often
serve women such as these for whom the alternative is no care at all.^2 -phesg communities

witness a social phenomenon in which midwives seek out pregnant women to educate them
and facilitate their improved nutrition, and thus effectively reduce the risk status of
individuals from an otherwise high risk population.'^^

CHAPTER n

ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR BIRTH
NATURAL CHILDBIRTH

Natural childbirth is not merely a technique, but a philosophy of childbirth
encompassing several natural styles of approaching childbirth. It has been referred to as a

technique by many who basically equate the term "natural childbirth" with "unmedicated

childbirth. The idea of going without pain medication was such a significant departure
from the norm when it was first introduced in the United States that specific pain control
techniques have persisted as the chief identifying feature of natural childbirth. This

distinction is not as significant anymore because these techniques are now commonly used
even m hospital births. The concept of natural childbirth has evolved and broadened to
address other issues besides pain control.

Grantly Dick-Read is considered by many to be the founder of the natural childbirth

philosophy. This English physician (1890-1959) published his provocative views that

birth, under normal circumstances, should be an essentially pain free and even "elating"
experience in his 1933 book Natural Childbirth.^ He based his conclusions on direct

observations of his own patients and women giving birth in underdeveloped countries.
The major premise of Dick-Read was that labor and delivery in developed countries
is accompanied by pain because women in these countries are conditioned by socialization
to expect pain. He explained the mechanism for this in physiological terms and called it the

fear-tension-pain" cycle. Dick-Read cited evidence from research in physiology that fear
during labor causes women to fight labor with voluntary muscle contraction instead of

relaxing and thus co-operating with labor. The resultant tension, changes in circulation and

the sympathetic nervous system, he asserted, cause pain (and also impede dilatation, or the

progress of labor). This pain further alarms the woman and,in validating her expectations,
perpetuates the cycle.2
In his book, he reviews the historical and cultural reasons women fear childbirth.

The primary reason he cites is ignorance of the process. His method included carefully
telling his patients what they could expect during labor, and why they would have certain
sensations. He would try to instill in them a faith in their own bodies' natural mechanisms

of pain control. He reported remarkable results repeated in thousands of his own patients.
He strongly urged prenatal education and predicted similar results for those who would
likewise prepare their patients.

Dick-Read was careful to note that while labor and birth are pain free under normal

circumstances, pathological circumstances could account for pain. As an obstetrician, he
would intervene in such cases and was not opposed to the use of pain medications under

such circumstances. He states that the development of anesthesia was "an important step
forward in the development of humane care during childbirth."^ But under non-

pathological circumstances, he charged that the interference of birth attendants who,

motivated by an excess of zeal, or anxiety bom of ignorance" or "misdirected kindness,"

is one of the most important causes of complications, morbidity and mortality in
childbirth.^

Perhaps the name most associated with natural childbirth is that of French

obstetrician Femand Lamaze. The Lamaze method involves the use of breathing techniques
to produce relaxation during labor, and psychological techniques of pain control based on

Pavlovian conditioning Lamaze studied in Russia. He independently corroborated the
findings of Dick-Read regarding the effects of fear on labor. His methods of

psychoprophylaxis (psychological prevention)of pain provided a substitute for analgesic
drugs for the first wave of American women who wished to experience natural childbirth.

Lamaze,through the educational efforts of Maijorie Karmel and Elisabeth Bing who

brought his techniques to the U.S. in 1959 and organized APSO(The American Society for
Psychoprophylaxis in Obstetrics), provided the first major alternative to conventional
obstetrics in the United States.^

Refinements in natural childbirth thought have occurred over the years. There are

natural childbirth advocates who now challenge the heavy chest breathing techniques of
Lamaze as unnatural and possibly harmful.^ Some of these refinements, such as
encouraging the laboring woman to focus on her own body and concentrate on relaxation

(rather than on an extemal focal point), have been made by American obstetrician Robert

Bradley.^ Dr. Bradley has also strongly advocated the active involvement of the father in
the process of birth and has created the American Academy of Husband Coached

Childbirth. This organization certifies childbirth preparation teachers who are very
rigorous in their promotion of totally natural childbirth, urging women to avoid all

chemicals(not merely drugs)from a period of three months prior to conception through
breastfeeding.8
GENTLE BIRTH

A second major challenge to conventional American obstetrics also came from a

French physician: Frederick Leboyer. Like Lamaze, who helped women participate in the
emotional meanings of birth by taking them out of"twihght sleep," Leboyer sought to
increase concern for the emotional asf)ects of birth for the newborn. Like Lamaze,
Leboyer s ideas spread quickly through the American populace and sparked a rethinking of
the childbirth experience. His concept of"gentle birth" included techniques oflow
lighting, gentle stimulation (as opposed to an upturned spanking) and even soft music to
greet the newborn in his first minutes of extrauterine life. The "Leboyer bath" became a

popular symbol of gentle birth, in which mother and father were encouraged to interact

with newborn by bathing him in water designed to pacify him by reproducing his recently
familiar surroundings.^

Gentle birth was not merely a fad, though interest in some of its techniques such as
the Leboyer bath" have waned. It became the popular focus for a discussion within
medicine that has significantly changed American obstetrics. That discussion was over the

then new concept of parent-infant "bonding" introduced by pediatricians Marshall Klaus

and John Kennell. Klaus and Kennell^® originally set out to explain why an unusually
high number of infants who had to be hospitalized for an extended period of time after birth

(e.g. premature infants) and who were doing well at the time of discharge, regressed and
failed to thrive once they were sent home. They noted different attitudes and behaviors

towards these infants from their parents as compared to the attitudes of parents who had

been in close contact with their infants from the time of birth onward. (The premature or
sick infants were more or less deprived of close parental contact by incubators and nurses.)
They refer to studies which show up to an 8 fold increase in later child abuse by such

parents.11 They concluded that these problems arose from a lack of touch and interaction
between parents and infants during a critical period of time: the minutes, hours and days
after birth. Their term,"bonding",refers to the special emotional attachment parents have
to their newborn which helps insure its survival.^2

Klaus and Kennell reached many conclusions regarding the emotional aspects of

birth and early child care after conducting many of their own clinical studies and reviewing
an impressive amount of data from the fields of physiology, animal behavior, psychology
and anthropology. They make a number of recommendations for optimal birth, and of
special significance to alternatives in childbirth made the following statements: "We believe

that there is strong evidence that at least 30 to 60 minutes of early contact in privacy should
be provided for every parent and infant to enhance the bonding experience." "We also

strongly urge that the infant remain with the mother as long as she wishes throughout the
hospital stay so that she and the baby can get to know each other."
FAMILY BIRTH

Related to the option of gentle birth and the enhancement of parent-infant bonding
are options regarding the presence of other persons during labor and delivery. As
previously noted, hospital births typically restrict the number of persons allowed in contact

with the laboring woman to one. And even after birth, allowing hospital visitation by the
woman's other children is a relatively new,experimental concept. Many home birth and

out-of-hospital birthing center attendants, on the other hand,encourage the presence of the
entire family throughout labor, delivery and the post-partum period.
Maijie and Jay Hathaway

have written an entire book about children at birth.

They propose several possible benefits of allowing children to witness this process. One

claimed benefit is that bonding of the family unit as a whole is thereby enhanced,leading to
greater acceptance of the new baby and, therefore, less subsequent sibling rivalry. They

also believe that children thus get a realistic view of childbirth as,for instance, involving
work. Yet in seeing that the event is tolerable, some of their own future anxieties over

childbirth may be allayed. Finally, witnessing birth is perhaps the most direct, natural,
parentally controlled and complete form of sex education.

Other authors stress some of the possible negative consequences of allowing
children to witness birth. There is concern that children may misinterpret the event as

assault up>on their mother, particularly if the delivery is difficult or requires surgical
intervention, and that this could be psychologically damaging to them. Furthermore, there
are obvious potential problems of the management of child behavior. Unpredictable
behavior could not only be very disruptive to the birth attendant's function, but also to the
mother's concentration.

ALTERNATIVES OFPOSmON AND MOVEMENT

There are several alternatives regarding the position and movement of women

during labor and delivery. The conventional position in which women give birth in

hospitals in the United States is the lithotomy position previously described. This position
has been so taken for granted in American obstetrics that as recently as 1980 the leading
textbook of medical obstetrics does not even mention the lithotomy position (or the

possibility of other positions for delivery). It merely mentions the details of positioning the
laboring woman's legs, etc., on the table. No justification for this position is given in the

text. Deviation from this position would be considered unusual in a U.S. hospital delivery.
Yet in global perspective, alternatives to this position are the rule rather than the

exception (at least in nonindustrialized societies). Medical anthropologist Betsy Lozoff
notes that in 90% of world cultures a woman's torso is upright (sitting, kneeling or

squatting with support)for buth.

These positions or a semi-recumbent or lateral lying

position are typical in home births and midwife attended births.

There are serious problems associated with giving birth in the lithotomy position.

In this position, the heavy uterus rests upon major blood vessels, and this can adversely
affect maternal blood pressure and fetal circulation.^^ Simple common sense would lead

one to conclude that it would be far easier for a woman to push a baby out in a squatting
position, with the full weight of the baby working with her (as observed in women of

nonindustrialized cultures) than with that weight working against her in pushing the baby
out laterally while on her back. It is also significant that squatting leaves both hands free

for the primitive" mother to deliver herself and that such a baby has not far to fall
Conversely the lithotomy position precludes the mother from using her hands to assure safe
reception of her slippery child several feet from the floor.

The most plausible explanation for the American standard of giving birth in the
lithotomy position, on a narrow table, raised in the air is that these features serve the

purposes of birth attendants. This setup allows attendants to see clearly, assess easily,

intervene quickly, and generally control the events of birth. Ironically, many of the very
interventions for which the setup is defended might be precluded by different positioning.
Perhaps a significant number of episiotomies,20 uses offorceps and even C-section might
be avoided by changing this standard practice. Obstetrical textbook authors are perplexed
that in perhaps one half of the cases where women fail to mount forces adequate to expel
the fetus the cause is unknown, yet they do not even list as a possibility the physiological
ramifications of the standard position for birth.21

Likewise, the conventional position for labor in U.S. hospitals is lying in bed with

perhaps periods of walking during early labor. Several technical aspects of hospital birth
contribute to this positioning. The signals from fetal heart and uterine monitors used in

hospitals are harder or impossible to obtain when the patient is upright or moving about
Blood pressure monitoring is also facilitated by bed confinement, and the frequently
present "LV." also tends to restrict movement

Opponents of hospital birth note that walking and upright positioning are well
known to promote labor. An upright position enlists gravity in the descent of the fetal head
and promotes changes of the cervix and pelvis which facilitate birth.22 Increased

frequency of contractions, shorter labors and less pain are also associated with upright
positions and movement during labor.23

Position during labor is also a factor in the comfort of the laboring woman.

Hospital birth opponents encourage women in labor to walk as much as possible and to
experiment with positions they may find more comfortable or to take a bath or shower.

They contend that restricted activity and confinement to unnatural positions leads to greater
fatigue and increased demand for pain medications.24 French obstetrician Michel O'dent,

who has his patients labor and deliver in positions most comfortable and natural to them,
reports only occasional use of pain medications,shorter than average labors, a C-section
rate of 8.3% and a perinatal morality rate of9 per 1,000 births.25
MEDICATION

Another set of alternatives in childbirth revolves around the use of medication.

There are several kinds of medication that are commonly used in hospital childbirth.

Included are pain medication,Pitocin and therapeutic medications (e.g. Magnesium Sulfate
for a condition of pregnancy called pre-eclampsia). The latter group contains medications
which are not used routinely and are generally accepted as appropriate in certain instances
by people on both sides of the medication in childbirth controversy. The common use of
pain medications and Pitocin, however, has been criticized by natural childbirth
proponents.

The alternatives to the use of pain medication have been described above in the

discussion of natural childbirth. But we must remember that many women either elect not
to use natural childbirth techniques of pain control or find them insufficient, and request
pain medication. The benefit of the use of pain medication in labor is obvious, but the risks

often are not. Yet the risks are many. They include risks of prolonging or even stopping
labor by decreasing uterine contractihty and the voluntary muscular activity of the laboring
woman,increased risk of post-partum hemorrhage, and depression of the infant's efforts to
breathe once delivered.^^

These and other risks of pain medication are well recognized by the medical

community, which admits "because of these inherent difficulties, no completely safe and
satisfactory method of pain relief in obstetrics has yet been developed."27 Moreover,

medicated childbirth critics such as Dr. Yvonne Brackbill, who has done extensive graduate
research on the effects of drugs used in pregnancy on the subsequent mental development

of the infant, are concerned about risks of these medications not widely recognized by
the medical community.

Much of today s concern over the risks of pain medication in childbirth stems from

the disastrous sequelae of general anesthesia used for many deliveries of the 1950's and

1960's. One complication of general anesthesia, the aspiration of vomited gastric contents
while anesthetized, described in 1946 by Mendelson,took a great toll of lives in American
obstetrics. As recently as 1972,this complication accounted for one half of the maternal

obstetric deaths in Great Britain.29 Another criticism of general anesthesia for childbirth is
that the mother is absent from the birth of her baby."^® This criticism is extended to the
use of narcotics that may not produce unconsciousness for the event, but decrease alertness

and, therefore, interfere with bonding. Even with the use of spinal or epidural anesthesia

(which allows the recipient to be fully alert while anesthetizing the lower half of the body),
a woman's ability to participate fully in her childbirth is impaired because she may not be
able to coordinate her efforts well with unfelt contractions.

Though general anesthesia,for these reasons, is no longer used for vaginal birth, a
common practice of hospital birth related to Mendelson's Syndrome has persisted. That

practice is to keep laboring women from eating so there will be nothing in their stomaches
to aspirate in the event that general anesthesia would have to be quickly applied for an
emergency C-section. The practice offasting during labor has been criticized by

Brackbiu31 as decreasing the strength, morale and pain threshold of the laboring woman,
necessitating a restricting "I.V." and is somewhat contradictory to other statements
regarding the prevention of Mendelson's Syndrome in obstetric literature.32

The risks of pain medications in labor are taken on the assumption that labor is
extremely painful. Williams Obstetrics used the terms "horrifying" and "unbearable" in

reference to labor and states, for the woman who has never borne a child, it"may be the
most painful event that she has ever experienced."33 This may be true, but severe pain in

labor is not a certainty. The statistics of practitioners of painless childbirth techniques
reveal anywhere from 75-98% of the women they attend willingly undergo labor without
the use of any pain medications.34 Perhaps women can tolerate more discomfort than

assumed. A recent study by Gintzler35 shows that due to substances called endorphins,
internally released during labor, a woman's pain threshold may be higher during childbirth
than at other times. Hospital birth may,however,actually be more painful than birth in the
alternate settings noted above owing to the use of different techniques, and humane
treatment may require the use of pain medications under some of these circumstances.

The use of Pitocin, a medication frequently used in hospital obstetrics, having the
actions of initiating or strengthening uterine contractions and thus promoting labor, is also

beset with significant risks. The most serious of these risks are those of causing
contractions that are too strong, in rare cases leading to uterine rupture; or unrelenting,
leading to fetal distress from compromised blood flow.^^ Pitocin can be very beneficial,
however,in stimulating arrested labor, which in itself poses risks to both mother and fetus.
But Pitocin can also be used to electively initiate labor and this poses the additional risk of

iatrogenic prematurity (for the calculated due date is not always accurate). This ability to
induce labor, moreover,can be abused for physician convenience and vocal childbirth

reformers^^ allege this to be frequently the case.
ELECTRONIC FETAL MONTrORING

Another technical option for childbirth is electronic fetal monitoring. There are two

types of electronic fetal monitoring, external and internal. In external monitoring, a fetal
heart tone sensor is affixed to a woman's abdomen by an elastic belt and a second belt is

used to attach a contraction sensing device. These sensors are connected by cords to a
bedside instrument which graphically records the trends of fetal heart rate and uterine

contractions in synchrony. Trends of fetal heart tones, when compared to simultaneous

uterine activity, are indicators of fetal well being. If the fetal head is low enough,an
electrode can be placed directly on it through the vaginal and cervical openings. This is
internal fetal heart monitoring. A pressure catheter can be introduced via the same route to

record uterine contractions. Both internal forms of monitoring are more precise than
external monitoring and each dispenses with the use of an external belt.

Obstetricians generally welcomed continuous fetal heart monitoring as a
breakthrough to provide early detection of fetal distress, leading to prompt intervention,
and this technique is used in nearly every hospital birth today. But statistics, well

recogni2ied by obstetrical authorities, have not shown the expected improvement in
outcome. At Parkland Memorial Hospital, a leading obstetrical research institution in

Dallas, Texas, it was found that "...the application of continuous electronic monitoring
cannot by itself be credited with any remarkable reduction in intrapartum or neonatal

mortahty... 38 "pjjg National Institues of Child Health also made a public statement to
affirm the adequacy of well-conducted clinical monitoring to match electronic monitoring in
effectiveness.39

Obstetrician Albert Havercamp, while chief of high risk obstetrics at the Denver

Medical Center, did a controUed prospective study^O of690 high risk obstetrical patients
regarding the use of electronic fetal monitoring. He divided laboring women into two

groups. One group was electronically monitored. The other group was "clinically"
monitored by nurses using stethoscopes to record fetal heart tones at regular intervals.
Havercamp concluded that there was no statistically significant difference in infant outcome

between the two groups. These outcomes were compared by parameters of neonatal
mortality, Apgar score(a measure of infant well being during the first 5 minutes after

birth), neurological status and course in the nursery. A very large, randomized,

prospective study of over 12,000 women was recently published'^1 which compared
electronic fetal monitoring to clinical monitoring by auscultation. Again, there was no

statistical difference found between the two groups regarding fetal or infant death, Apgar
score, need for resuscitation or transfer to special care nursery.
Why has electronic fetal monitoring not improved fetal outcome as much as

expected? The answer may lie in some potential problems which accompany the technique.
First, though a bedside electronic monitor may be recording every fetal heartbeat and

maternal contraction, to be of value, a human being must still be present to see and interpret
the data. Nurses who come in to "review the strip" may do so no more than they once
came in to listen to the heart tones. And though they can study the record of what

happened in their absence, they also lose some touch with the laboring woman herself,
which may in subtle ways offset this advantage.
Other risks of monitoring include the restriction of movement and recumbent

positioning to protect the quality of the tracing, with their inherent risks mentioned above.

Technical difficulties in obtaining a high quality tracing (at least with external monitors)

persist despite a lack of movement,and internal monitoring precludes walking or an upright
position altogether. The reason for the latter is related to a significant intervention required
by the use of internal monitoring. That intervention is to "rupture the membranes"(to
break the protective barrier that keeps the fetus in a sterile environment). The internal
monitor electrode cannot be placed on the fetal head without doing this.
The purposeful rupture of the membranes itself has numerous risks. Studies

indicate that the subsequent loss of amniotic fluid, which surrounds and cushions the fetus,
leads to fetal stress and increases the likelihood of compression of the umbilical cord.42

Also, with the sterile barrier around the fetus broken,infection increases, particularly in
this case where monitor leads provide a tract to introduce pathogens from the external
environment. Two studies confirm this predicted increase in infection in internally

monitored women.^^

fact, standard obstetrical practice dictates that a woman who has

not delivered within 24 hours after the membranes are ruptured should have a C-section to

prevent significant infection.^ Finally, complications of trauma from placing internal
monitors have been reported.^5
Surgical Procedures

There are several surgical procedures common to hospital and physician attended
birth, uncommon or absent in other settings and in midwife attended births. The first of

these to be considered is a procedure called episiotomy,in which the vaginal opening is
enlarged by means of an incision. In 1979,episiotomies were performed in 62.5% of

vaginal deliveries in U.S. hospitals.'^^ Birthing centers report the use of this technique in
19 to 39% of their cases and the incidence of episiotomy is usually under 20% in home
birth statistics.'^^

Reasons for performing episiotomies taught in obstetrical training programs include
substituting a straight incision for a jagged tear, which, therefore, heals better and is easier

to repair; and sparing the fetal head from being a "battering ram" against the pelvic floor
(which is thought to possibly cause brain damage).^^ Also included as justification for the

technique are the ideas that it shortens the second stage of labor and protects against the
development of certain gynecological disorders ("pelvic floor relaxation")later in life for
women who deliver vaginally.'^^

Regarding the usage of episiotomy to prevent poorly healing tears, Kitzinger^O
reported that a greater number of women had significant pain seven days after deliveiy if
they had had an episiotomy than women who did not have the procedure and suffered
tears. She also found that women in the episiotomy group had a higher incidence of

painful intercourse lasting more than three months after delivery than their counterparts.

Furthermore, traumatic tears from childbirth are not a certain consequence if an episiotomy
is not performed. One large study of midwife attended births revealed neither tears nor
episiotomy in 49.8% of their deliveries.51

Regarding the belief that episiotomy prevents pelvic floor relaxation, a study
published as recently as July, 1985 in the British medical journal. Lancet, showed "no
correlation between the degree of perineal trauma and subsequent muscle function."52 No
support could be found for the idea that episiotomy led to improved healing or that the

stretching of the intact pelvic floor by childbirth leads to its permanent damage.
In a comprehensive review of literature regarding episiotomy,including more than
350 articles and book chapters written between 1860 and 1980, Thacker and Banta53

found no evidence that episiotomy reduces the number of extent of lacerations, and state
that while episjotomy has been shown to shorten the second stage of labor, this has not

been demonstrated to reduce the incidence of cerebral damage to the infant. They also
found no data to suggest a lower incidence of pelvic floor relaxation after the use of
episiotomy. Thacker and Banta conclude that little research has been done to test for the

hypothesized benefits of episiotomy, and add, having noted several risks of the procedure.
It is incumbent on those advocating a procedure to prove benefit in adequately designed
clinical trials."54

A second surgical technique primarily of the medical setting is the use of forceps.
Forceps as a means to accomplish difficult deliveries has been in existence for several

hundred years. The instrument, inserted through the vagina, around the fetal head, aUows

the attendant to exert traction on the fetus to aid in its delivery. This was often a life saving
technique before C-sections were introduced as an alternative method of extracting a fetus
which would not, for one reason or another, descend through the birth canal. The

considerable forces thus applied, however,lead to potential complications of maternal and

fetal trauma. These cover a spectrum ranging from simple bruising to broken facial bones,
nerve damage and even intracranial hemorrhage for the fetus and significant hemorrhage
from lacerations of the cervix and vagina for the mother.35 Deaths of infants and mothers

have been directly attributed to the use of this technique. A recent study places the perinatal
mortality rate from use of forceps at 8 per 10,000 births.56

The use of forceps has steadily decreased due to the increased use of C-sections and

the decrease of heavy sedation and general anesthesia which used to require the physician's
physical effort to deliver the infant in lieu of effort by the weakened or unconscious

mother. C-sections have particularly decreased the use of"high forceps"(applied while the
fetal head is high in the maternal pelvis) which carried the highest risks of trauma and
death.

The third surgical technique common to hospital and physician attended births
absent from all other births is the C-section. Natural childbirth, home birth and midwife

attended birth advocates do not criticize this technique per se,in fact they welcome it as a

life saving technique in certain situations. They do, however, question the necessity of
many of the C-sections performed today. Their skepticism over the incidence of C-sections
today is based on the following information.

In the years after World War II and prior to 1960,the incidence of C-sections in

U.S. births ranged from 2 to 5%. As of 1984, the national incidence was 18% overall and

certain regions of the U.S. and specific hospitals had even higher percentages.^"^ And
regional and hospital to hospital variations in the C-section rate do not correlate well with

the risk categories of the populations served. Some hospitals serving high risk populations
have a lower-than-average rate.58 This alarmingly high overall, but regionally
inconsistent, increase in the use of C-sections caused consumer groups to question whether
all these surgeries were actually related to maternal and fetal obstetrical needs. In the words

of Dr. Harold Schulman, past chairman of Albert Einstein College of Medicine's
department of obstetrics and gynecology,"we could just never believe that nature would

make the mistake of constructing the female body in a way that would require surgery for
one out of five women to give birth."59

Indeed, several studies have shown that some of the reasons for the increase in the

C-section rate are non-medical. Dr. Helen Marieskind, commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Health Education and Welfare to report on the increase in C-sections in the

United States, stated in her 1979 report^® that the threat of malpractice litigation was a
major factor influencing the trend towards more C-sections. Obstetricians she interviewed

commonly held the belief that courts would find them negligent if they did not perform a Csection in the face of even minor complications of a labor that subsequently produced a less
than normal infant.

Another reason for the increase in C-sections independent of the well being of the
mother and fetus at the time of surgery is a history of previous C-section. For years,
obstetrical practice conformed to the dictum "once a C-section, always a C-section."61
This was due to the 1/2 to 2% chance of uterine rupture along the old scar line thought to be
increased by the strain of labor. Automatic repeat C-sections account for about one third

(approximately 200,000)^2 of those done each year in the U.S., and thus an ever

increasing percentage of them,despite a change in common C-section surgical technique
(the use of a transverse lower uterine incision) that makes the likelihood of uterine rupture
in labor far less now. In fact, not one maternal death has been reported resulting from a
ruptured transverse lower uterine scar.63 One large study actually showed higher maternal
and infant mortality rates in cases where a C-section was automatically repeated, than in
cases where women tried to deliver vaginally after a previous C-section.^

C-sections have also increased in incidence because of their increased use to deliver

breech infants (those not in the normal head down position). About 3.5% of fetuses are in

a breech position at the time of delivery and, for technical reasons, the vaginal delivery of
these infants is significantly more compUcation-prone than that of"head down" fetuses.65

The safe vaginal delivery of breech infants requires special skills which are dying out in the
field of obstetrics. Similarly, there has been an increase in C-sections performed to prevent

the transmission of genital herpes to infants which reflects an increase in the incidence of
this disease.

Other reasons for the increase in C-sections include a 30% increase in C-sections

for dystocia and a 5% increase in C-sections for fetal distress during the 1970s~the decade

during which electronic fetal monitoring became widespread.^^ There are two possible
interpretations for the latter statistic. Perhaps electronic fetal monitoring detected cases of

fetal distress that would have gone without intervention before the age of this technique. It
is also possible that problems associated with this technique, addressed above, may have
produced more distress and therefore led to more C-sections.

For the infant, the risks of C-section include risks of prematurity, increased

jaundice, complications of anesthesia such as decreased effort to breathe once delivered,
and a lung disorder known as Respiratory Distress Syndrome.67 But rarely do these risks
lead to permanent damage for the infant. Risks for the mother include increased blood loss

(10% of the time requiring transfusion with its inherent risks), infection, and complications
of anesthesia, not to mention increased pain,increased duration of hospital stay and
expense, and decreased quality of early maternal-infant interaction.68 The maternal

mortality associated with C-section is 2 in 1,000,69 which is 2 to 4 times that of women

who deliver vaginally.70 When we note this increased mortality, however, we must
remember that probably even more of these women would die in the same situations if
surgery were not performed. If there is a small number of women who die from the

complications of a C-section which would have faired better without having had the
procedure, it would be very hard to estimate.

One important effect of the rise in C-sections has been its contribution to the

increase in the cost of health care. Both the NIH^l and HEW,72 who commissioned

studies of the problem in 1979 and 1980, were concerned with this consequence. When all
the factors above were analyzed, both the NIH and HEW studies concluded that the C-

section rate could be decreased without adversely affecting maternal and infant health. The
HEW study estimated that at least 95 million U.S. health care dollars could thus be saved
each year.73

Many criticisms of the rise in the number of C-sections are actually criticisms of
interventionism and its iatrogenic complications which lead to C-sections. One author

conceives of hospital birth practices as a "technological daisy chain," noting that one

intervention leads to another "so that accepting the first intervention increases the possibility
that a second intervention will become 'necessary,' which in turn increases the probability

of a third, and so on."'74 a lack of money to pay the wages of enough nurses to clinically
monitor the heart tones of each fetus may lead to a first step of using electronic fetal

monitoring. This leads to less walking and supine positioning during labor, which in turn
may lead to failure to progress or fetal distress, which in turn may lead to the use of Pitocin
or a cesarean section, which may each lead to the use of more pain medication which can

harm the fetus/infant. Fasting to prevent aspiration pneumonia, should general anesthesia
need to be used for an emergency cesarean section, may lead down a similar, and selffulfilling, path of events.

HYGffiNIC PROCEDURES

Two final techniques associated with conventional hospital deliveiy which will be
considered here are pre-delivery perineal shaving and enemas. Though the utilization of

these techniques is probably decreasing, one or both of these remain routine procedure in
many hospitals. Both have been traditionally justified by arguments that they decrease
infection associated with delivery, and arose as standard practices near the turn of the
century when it was accepted by the medical community that "childbirth fever" could be
reduced by the use of hygienic techniques.

Although no one disputes the fact that the incidence of birth related infection has

decreased with generally improved cleanliness and sanitation these two specific techniques

have not been shown to contribute to that effect. Microscopic cuts associated with shaving
and the liquification of bowel contents that accompanies pre-delivery enemas may actually
increase the birth related infection rates. Drs. Charles Mahan and Susan McKay,75 after

reviewing numerous studies published in the obstetrical literature since 1922,consistently
found conclusions which stated there were more infections in women who had perineal
shaving and enemas than in those who did not. They recommend that the former technique
be discontinued completely and that the latter be used only for specific indications affecting
delivery. They also point out that both practices produce discomfort and are found to be
distasteful or demeaning to most women.

CHAPTER m

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Hospitals,formally trained birth attendants and most of the techniques used in birth

today have existed for only a small fraction of human history. Women gave birth without
anesthesia up until 1853 when James Simpson administered chloroform to Queen Victoria

during labor.^ It was not until about 1900 that more U.S. births were attended by
physicians than by midwives.2 More births occurred at home than in U.S. hospitals until
1939.3 Electronic fetal monitoring was not developed until 1972.4
Throughout the vast majority of history, birth proceeded with none of the amenities

we have today - and the human population grew - but many women and infants died during
those millenia from complications of childbirth we can rectify today. The human race has

not been content with the mere "survival of the fittest." Attendants were sought who
possessed life-saving skills and technology. An early example would be the forceps
technology of the Chamberlen family in England.^ Yet along with the technological

changes of the industrial revolution, other trends also influenced a shift in birth practices.
The overlapping Victorian era gave rise to a new concept of women as frail and

genteel. New technologies and the development of a larger wealthy class allowed more
women to refrain from strenuous household chores and adopt a more social role. A

popular view at the turn of the century, promoted by women's magazines of the day, was
that childbirth as it had been known was too earthy, unladylike and rigorous for the modem

woman.6 Some today interpret the trend of more women seeking the care of male
physicians during childbirth at this time to a "fashion" of having men do the hard work of

childbirth with forceps while they rested under anesthesia.^ Socioeconomic level began to
determine birth attendant.

The so called Flexner Report of 1910^ also affected birth practices. This report on
the quality of health care education in the U.S. led to accreditation policies and selective
governmental funding of only certain schools which met the criteria of the report Until the

time of the Flexner Report there were many schools of thought and practice within U.S.

health care. Midwifery was accepted within this pluralism. Through directed government
subsidies, and later by licensing regulations, the long term effect of the Flexner Report was
the extinction of essentially all but the allopathic and osteopathic schools of health care. As

medical schools grew, greater numbers of women were attracted to the centralized hospital
setting for maternity care, but this apparently did not improve birth outcomes during the
early years.^

It is known that "childbirth fever" (puerpural sepsis), however, which claimed

many maternal lives during the 19th century, actually became more prevalent as physicians
delivered more women and hospitalization became the rule. It was not until

Simmelweiss^® educated the medical community that physicians were transmitting
infection from diseased patients to women in labor, and they began to wash their hands in
between, that this trend reversed. Midwives during the same period, who delivered more
women in the home setting, had much lower infection rates.11

Birth statistics were not required in all of the United States until 1933, so
comparisons of attendants and settings before that time must be based on local data. A
sampling of material and neonatal mortality studies from the first three decades of this

century (see Appendix A)reveals consistently lower rates for midwives than physicians.
The White House Conference on Child Health and Protection of 1932 reviewed these and

other studies and concluded These statistics show very favorable maternal mortality rates

in the practice of midwives..."

The New York Academy of Medicine issued a report in

1933 with similar conclusions, stating,

To the Committee it seems fair to say that contrary to the generally accepted
opinion, the midwife is an acceptable attendant for properly selected cases
of labor and delivery.... We have seen that her results are as good as those
obtained by the physician under what are justly regarded as comparable
circumstances and for comparable cases.

Some errors of medical thinking were perpetuated in the years after the Flexnor
Report tended to silence dissenting philosophies. Great among these were the ideas of

pioneering obstetrician Joseph B.DeLee, who,early in the 1920s, proposed the use of
prophylactic forceps" and a generous episiotomy to prevent damage to the fetal brain and

maternal pelvic floor from the forces of delivery.

DeLee never proved his assertions, but

his theory was accepted as if it were scientific fact His techniques rapidly became the
standard of obstetric care for physicians across the U.S. and many of these practices
continued, essentially unquestioned,for more than 40 years. Later, physicians came to
realize that the routine application offorceps leads to greater, not less, infant and maternal

morbidity and mortality. Nevertheless, even since the routine use of forceps has died out,
the nearly routine episiotomy practice still persists, based on DeLee's early assertions, but
without the justification of science.

We may speculate about further ramifications of DeLee's influence. In proposing
that even normal birth is potentially damaging to both mother and child, and in need of a

prophylactic (preventative) technique, we find roots for the notion that birth is basically
pathological and in need of the services of a physician. Edwards and Waldorfl5 feel that

as this concept spread, women lost confidence that birth was a normal physiological

function that they could perform themselves. Instead of seeking a physician and hospital
only when something went wrong in labor and delivery, they came to feel that they should
always have one to intervene.

Since 1933, maternal and perinatal mortality have steadily declined. In 1935,the
maternal mortality rate was 582 in 100,000. By 1982, it had dropped to 9 in 100,000.^6
Perinatal mortality has dropped from 40 in 1,000 in 1950 to 18 in 1,000 in 1980.17 To

what can these improvements be attributed? Obstetricians credit "the great increase in the
proportion of hospital deliveries" and the increase in care by individuals specially trained in

obstetrics and perinatology.l^ They also credit better blood banking and antibiotics and the
improvement of surgical technology. Stewartl9 and others^O concede that these

developments have decreased deaths resulting from unavoidable pathology, but credit more

of the overall decline in maternal and perinatal mortality to factors that have improved health
in general, such as improved nutrition, education and sanitation.

Certain social and economic influences on the mortality statistics must also be
considered. It is well known that American minorities, such as blacks, have had
consistently poorer perinatal mortality statistics, due to a greater number oflow birth

weight infants and stillbirths. These outcomes are thought to be directly related to low
socioeconomic level with its associated lack of good prenatal care and nutrition. Low birth
weight, the leading cause of neonatal death, is also related to the number of children a

woman bears.21 Devitt22 observes that the significant declines in perinatal mortality in the
1930s and again in the 1970s,sometimes attributed to the increased use of new obstetrical

technologies of those decades (forceps and electronic fetal monitoring, respectively), could
also be associated with lower birth rates during those same decades. During the 1930s, the

Great Depression contributed to fewer births and during the 1970s,concern for population
growth, the availability of contraceptives and legalized abortion contributed to fewer births.

Devitt proposes that fewer pregnancies per mother, resulting in higher birth weight infants,
could account for these trends of decreased perinatal mortality.

CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

The foregoing historical perspective sharply contrasts the birth experience of the last

100 years with the birth experience of essentially the rest of human history. Likewise, the
American birth experience can be contrasted with that of much of the rest of the world.

Worldwide, midwives still attend more births than do physicians.23 The majority of the
world s births are probably still unmedicated and a large percentage still take place outside

of hospitals. As mentioned above,in the majority of the world's anthropological cultures,
women deliver in an upright position. We can view the twentieth century U.S. childbirth
experience as a historically and culturally focal experiment to try to improve birth
outcomes.

The U.S. spends a greater percentage of its financial resources(and a much greater
actual amount of money)on birth than any other country in the world.24 More medical

technology is applied to childbirth here than in any other country. Yet,for as long as
yearly international perinatal mortality statistics have been tabulated, the U.S. has never

been one of the top ten countries in world ranking and typically falls between 15th and 18th

(see Appendix B). Many explanations are put forth to explain this disparity, but the
variables which influence perinatal mortality are so numerous and complex that no one can
say with certainty which differences in the childbirth practices of countries lead most to
superior outcomes.

First, as is important with all statistical comparisons, we must determine whether

the statistical entities in question are equally defmed. Defenders of the poor U.S. world

infant mortahty rank long pointed to the fact that infant mortality was not defined equally by
all the countries submitting data. For years in the U.S., aU deaths of infants bom alive

after 20 weeks gestational age were included in the infant mortality figure, whereas in some
European countries only deaths of infants bom alive after 28 weeks were reported. The

difference was to the statistical disadvantage of the U.S. Several biostatisticians^^ have

produced adjusted tables of international infant morality by recalculating the rates using
estimates of the number of infant deaths between 20 and 28 weeks in the countries in
question. They concluded that there would be no more than a 4% variation in the

individual rates. This much variation would barely,if at all, alter the U.S. placement in
world rank. Furthermore, since at least 1970, all countries reporting vital statistics for

international tabulation have used the same United Nations definition of live birth, which is
not based on gestational age, but rather on signs of life.26

The poor world ranking of the U.S. has also been attributed to the racial diversity
of U.S. citizens in a melting pot," reasoning that interracial breeding produces a greater
amount of cephalopelvic disproportion (CPD). CPD is the condition in which the fetal

head is too large to pass out through the maternal pelvis. This condition can affect infant
and maternal mortality. This theory is difficult to substantiate for several reasons.

Unfortunately, many cases of dystocia, or failure to progress in labor, are casually
attributed to CPD for lack of another explanation (see discussion of birth position above)
without the verification of measurements. Moreover,this argument is criticized on the
basis that the U.S. may not be so different from other countries which outrank it with
regard to the amount of racial mixing.27

The most plausible explanations of the disparity between countries' perinatal
statistics have to do with two major factors: the general health of their populations and their
health care delivery systems. Many studies show that the quality of prenatal care and
nutrition is a major determinant of perinatal mortality. In Sweden,pre-and post-natal care
are assured by comprehensive federal funding.28 Midwives active in community settings
are key to the distribution of this care. Though the U.S. may claim the highest standard of
living in the world,this is a statement regarding averages. Impoverished segments of the

U.S. population are responsible for much of our poor standings in perinatal mortality.
Many of the countries which rank above the U.S. have more evenly distributed resources.
Many of these countries also lack the degree of drug abuse and teenage pregnancy(which
lead to prematurity and low birth weight)found in the U.S. Prematurity accounts for 60%
to 70% of our perinatal morbidity and mortality.29

Several differences with regard to the health care delivery systems of countries

which outrank the U.S. in birth related statistics can be observed. Nearly eveiy European
country which generates better statistics than ours relies heavily on midwives to provide

deliveiy services. Historically, the professions of midwifery and medicine have grown up
together in these countries, and midwives are legally protected and publically supported as
an integral part of the obstetrical team.30 jn Sweden, which consistently leads the list of
countries with the lowest infant mortality, almost every woman is attended by a midwife
whether she is attended also by a physician or noL^^ The same is true in Denmark and the
Netherlands. The midwife is considered the expert in low-risk deliveries and the

obstetrician the expert in high-risk deliveries and when complications arise. There is a

degree of mutual respect and support between midwives and physicians in these countries,
unknown here, and a system of care that assures appropriate "back-up" services.
In the Netherlands, the screening techniques and "back-up" network of physicians
cooperating with midwives have been refmed to the point that it consistently ranks near the
top of birth safety lists while a large number of births still occur in the home. In 1965,

69% of Holland s infants were bom at home, and its infant mortality rate was 14.4 per
thousand, compared to 24.7 per thousand in the U.S. that year.32 Holland's home birth

infant mortality rate was lower than for Holland as a whole, also.33 By 1970,57% of
Holland s births occurred at home, but the number has steadily decreased and is now under
40%. Nevertheless, the Netherlands has produced excellent birth related statistics despite

this significant percentage of home births. The Netherlands does have a significant
geographical situation that undoubtedly contributes to its successfulness with home birth.

No home is more than 30 minutes away from a hospital.34 This helps expedite emergency
transfer in the event of a labor and deliveiy complication.

CHAPTER IV

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

ETHICAL THEORIES

The foregoing material has dealt with the more factual aspects of childbirth
alternatives. Let us now turn to the philosophical discussion of childbirth alternatives.

First, a foundation of general ethical theories and principles must be laid. A number of

ethical theories have been developed to try to provide internally consistent philosophical

frameworks which can be used to sort out the complexities of ethical problems and justify
moral conclusions. There are two dominant general categories of ethical theory: teleology
and deontology.!

In teleological ethical theories the standard by which an action is judged to be

morally right is the amount of non-moral good^ which is brought about by it. More

specifically, these theories are concerned with the greatest balance of this non-moral good
over its opposite. By non-moral good,ethicists are referring to something of valuesomething we desire or strive to obtain. Ethical teleologists make decisions with such an

end(Greek telos) in mind. An example of a non-moral good is pleasure (or the absence of

pain). This end is the basis of the familiar theory of ethical hedonism,in which the right
action(among those available to the decision maker)is the one which leads to the greatest
balance of pleasure over pain. Other non-moral goods which may serve as ends for
teleological theories could include power,self-actualization or knowledge.
There are several problems with this theory. One problem with teleological ethics is
that it is difficult to identify, predict and quantify the non-moral good which will come
about as the consequence of any given action. Yet this must be done before actions can be

weighed against each other in this way. Assigning such a quantitative value to actions can

be very difficult; but even if it can be done, we are left with another problem with this

theory. The common question "Does the end justify the means?" makes reference to this
problem.

Let us propose that in a particular situation there are two available options, and that
we have been able to determine the quantity of non-moral good each will^ bring about. Let
us say that option A produces 50 units of good, but involves breaking a promise. Option B
produces only 40 units of good, but involves no such violation of what we would

otherwise consider right behavior. By teleological reasoning, option A should still be

chosen over option B,even if the negative value of breaking the promise is already
calculated into the overall value of option A.

Deontological ethical theories, however, propose that certain actions are morally
right even if they do not produce the greatest possible balance of non-moral good over its

opposite.^ Deontologists assert that we recognize certain behaviors as morally right or
wrong not because of the value they bring into existence, but because of other

charactenstics of the acts themselves. Examples of deontological moral principles include
the rules that one should not tell a lie and that one should keep promises (despite the
consequences).

There are several problems with deontological ethical theory,just as there were with
the teleological theory. One problem with this theory is that ofjustifying particular
behaviors as moral duties. If the amount of good produced is not used as the criterion for
the rightness of acts, what does make them right? There are several answers to this

question, such as that they are commanded by God,or that they are just, or that they are
simply self evident. A second major objection to this ethical theory is the problem of
deciding which principle should take precedence when two of them come into conflict.

One could,for instance, propose a scenario in which not telling a lie could conflict with
keeping a promise. This will be discussed further below.

There are several other general ethical theories which include ethical egoism and
appeals to authority such as the Divine Command theory. Ethical egoists^ hold that a

person s basic moral obligations to act in ways which most promote their own good. This

theory is based on the concept of psychological egoism which states that a person really can
not be expected to purposefully do otherwise than to act in self interest. Even if one acts

for the benefit of others, ethical egoists argue that such action is motivated by some kind of
reward to the benefactor, else they would not have acted so.

Whether psychological egoism is true, however, we are left with two major

problems with ethical egoism as an ethical theory. One of these problems is that egoistic
moral decisions are difficult (if not theoretically impossible) to universalize, and because of

this, the theory is of little use in our endeavor to develop normative ethics(which is the

basis for the ability to judge and advise). Another problem with this theory is the

observation that some actions taken by people, out of a conviction that they are right, do
not seem to promote their self interest.

Divine Command theory^ states that an act is right or wrong simply because God
has commanded or forbidden it. The problems of this theory are, a) metaphysical
questions about the existence of God beyond the scope of this discussion, and b)the
question of how to know what God has commanded even if His existence is established.

Authority figures disagree in their moral judgements and people disagree as to what God

has commanded. Nevertheless, many people the world over appeal to authority for the
moral justification of their actions.

This very brief overview of theoretical ethics has been given merely to provide

enough information to establish the moral perspective of the author. Regarding appeal to

authority which was just discussed, I reject this theory because I find no higher authority
for moral decision than the moral agent himself. I hold the view that what is right is so
independently of whether someone states that it is right, and that each person should be

moral sense). As will be yet developed, this idea undergirds my specific theory of moral
obligation.

I am left, then, with the general deontological point of view. There are several

forms of this theory. One way in which to divide deontology is to distinguish between act

deontology and rule deontology. Act deontologists hold that each situation is so unique as
to render general rules of duty unhelpful. But I believe that there is at least some significant
commonality between various situations to justify the formation of rules. I am sensitive to

the concerns of act deontologists, however, and of the major ethical theorists, I probably
fall closest in view to W.D.Ross, who, through a rule deontologist, proposes a method
which deals nicely with the problems of situational uniqueness. Furthermore, his model of

deontology goes far to meet a major criticism of the general theory: the problem of the
potential conflict of two duties.

First, I agree with Ross in his general defense^ of deontological point of view
when he rightly questions whether people commonly consider the consequences of their

actions when they fulfill a promise or perform some other duty. Ross contends that people
apprehend a number of moral duties which,in and of themselves, ought to be carried out

These,including examples cited above such as not telling lies, and others,such as repaying
debts, Ross calls primafacie duties. These are things which are always right to do, aU
other things being equal. Ross formulated the idea ofprimafacie duties realizing that
duties sometimes come into conflict What one determines to be the greatest of these duties

when they come into conflict is what Ross calls one's actual duty. He does not want us to

discount the theoretical tightness of the lesser, overriden primafacie duty,though.
To the objection that there is still no absolute way to determine what Ross would

call actual duty in a case where moral principles conflict, he says this is at least no worse
than the position of the teleologist.

For when we have to choose between the production of two heterogeneous
goods,say knowledge and pleasure, the "ideal utilitarian" theory can only
fall back on an opinion,for which no logical basis can be offered, that one
of the goods is the greater; and this is no better than a similar opinion that
one of two duties is the more urgent.^

But even if there is no absolute way to resolve the conflict between two moral duties, rules
about the application of deontological principles (e.g. hierarchies, excluding statements)
can be made to help settle such conflicts for practical purposes.

One such hierarchy to which I subscribe is a ranking of the components of

beneficence. Beneficence (to be discussed below)can be broken down into the following
concepts: a) we ought not inflict harm, b) we ought to prevent harm,c) we ought to
remove evil, and d) we ought to promote good. Frankena^^ suggests that duty "a"
supercedes "b," which supercedes "c," which supercedes "d," which he states is not even a

duty in the strict sense. Ross^ ^ also favors this hierarchy, noting that
"...even when we have come to recognize the duty of beneficence, it
appears to me that the duty of non-maleficence [duty "a" above] is'
recognized as a distinct one, and as primafacie more binding. We should
not in general consider it justifiable to kill one person in order to keep
another alive, or to steal from one in order to give alms to another."

This view is consistent with my world view, mentioned above,and the simple concept
"First do no harm."

And so we come down to my proposed theory of moral obligation. It is a rule

deontological theory, in the tradition of Ross, which recognizes primafacie duties which
we ought to fulfill despite the consequences. That is, we ought to fulfill these duties if
theoretically possible, and this admits only to the case where primafacie duties conflict. In

such cases, we must look for other morally relevant data and concepts (such as the

hierarchy of beneficence above) to help us determine our actual duty. The following
discussion regards just such morally relevant information, which will be used in helping to
determine our actual duty in this case where the primafacie duties of beneficence,respect
for autonomy and justice towards both mother and fetus come into conflict

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

Beneficence

The first of these principles to be discussed here is the principle of beneficence.

This is not benevolence, which is a disposition towards doing good; but is actually doing
good (and preventing harm). This is a primary moral obligation. In medical ethics,
beneficence often concerns itself with promoting the good of biological life and health.

Therefore, the first value considered here is the value of life itself, which is probably the
strongest value held by our culture.

Man has always demonstrated an inborn drive to live and lengthen life; even to

achieve immortality. The possession of life is a prerequisite to the possession of any other
value. One cannot,for instance, be free and value freedom unless one is alive. In this

sense, life has the highest of practical values. We have learned, though, particularly in
recent years of the development of extraordinary ability to keep human beings alive, that

biological life, in and of itself, may not necessarily be good. Mere life, for some,can be a
loathsome sentence. There are fates worse than death. Life, under some of these

circumstances, may be viewed as actually having negative value.
While it is questionable that the phenomenon of suicide confirms this, humans are

known to occasionaUy rank life itself below some other value. The example of battle can
be cited, where people have willingly risked and given their lives to attain values which

they hold more dear; values which give life its significance. Just as freedom cannot be

valued without life, many have not valued Ufe without freedom. These points illustrate an
ethical concern for the quality of life. Many view the value of life as variable, not absolute,
and related to its quality.

But there is another valuation of life which is independent of its quality or practical
worth. That is the moral value, or sanctity, of life itself. Let us take the example of an
anencephalic infant. Such an infant cannot experience the freedom of choice which makes

humans unique nor many other rewards of living. In a practical sense, its life is of little

good to it The usefulness or purpose of that life is thwarted. Yet many maintain that such
an infant has full moral value; that its life ought to be viewed as of equal value to the life of
anyone else.

The dispute over the quality of life versus the sanctity of life as a basis for ethical

decision making will no doubt rage on and may end in stalemate. A resolution is not

expected. But it is helpful to be clear about the cause for much of the difference in point of

view. There may be atheists who emphasize the sanctity of life independent of its quality,
but most who are vocal about the sanctity, or absolute value, of life are influenced by
specific theological beliefs. Roman Catholics, Mormons and numerous protestants believe

that at the moment of conception a human soul is created or infused into the conceptus.
This soul has full moral significance to them regardless of the characteristics of the

conceptus. This soul is one for whom Jesus died and salvation is prepared if the biological
entity which houses it can survive long enough. What could have greater value to persons
of this persuasion?

There are others, including myself, who do not believe this way and do not give all
entities which are biologically human the same "all or nothing" value. To them,it is
reasonable to place value on that which is biologically human according to the degree to

which it possesses characteristics which make human beings human;that is, qualitatively
different from other creatures and, particularly, persons. That which parallels the term
soul for people of this persuasion is a grouping of mental processes. When these
processes no longer exist at the end of the life continuum, the human person-that of moral

significance-is dead. Likewise, at the beginning of the life continuums a person of full

moral significance does not yet exist. What is considered morally appropriate treatment
may vary with that entity's acquisition of certain characteristics. People of this persuasion
are more likely to defend the options of abortion and euthanasia, for under some

circumstances, other values may be viewed as taking precedence over biological life.
Both groups must, however, consider the symbolic value of biological humans.

Those who allow the death of a defective newborn out of a valuing of a certain quality of
life may nonetheless grieve for the loss of that entity which strongly signified a human
relationship. Whether or not one believes a human body houses a soul, how we treat a

malformed, dying or dead human being will influence how we treat living, whole persons.
Applying these concepts to the ethics of childbirth alternatives, beneficence may not
be seen by all as requiring that biological life be preserved at all costs. One home birth

advocate(who cannot be taken as representative of all home birth advocates)even
suggested that home birth, by virtue of its lack of immediate access to intensive neonatal

care technology, provides the benefit of allowing more defective newboms to die a natural

death and avoid the grim realities that often accompany the technological prolongation of

the lives ofsuch infants.^2 Most home birth advocates probably do not feel this way,but
rather believe that home birth mortality is in fact lower than hospital birth mortality. But
even those who feel they may be taking a small additional risk with the biological life of
their fetus when choosing home birth may be motivated by beneficence, believing their
child will enjoy better psychological well being or other benefits.

There are probably people on both sides of the sanctity of life/quality of life debate

in each of the opposing camps of the childbirth altematives debate. Those who justify
talcing the precautions of hospital birth on the argument that all lives are sacred and no
unnecessary chances should be taken, would,if they were consistent, avoid the use of all

pain medications also, since they pose "unnecessary" risks to the life of the fetus. There

are others who value maternal freedom from pain above any small increased risk that pain
medication will cause fetal harm.

Is not the alleviation of pain doing good? Are not pain medications "an important
step forward in the development of humane care during childbirth"?13 is not the

strengthening of family units and improved psychological health of infants claimed by
those who favor childbirth alternatives which maximize bonding beneficent? There are

many goods which may be promoted by different childbirth experiences. Similarly, we see
there are several kinds ofprimafacie duties of beneficence at play in childbirth alternatives.
Autonomy

The ethical principle of autonomy, or the right to self-determination, is highly
valued in modem, western civilization. Autonomy has been the dominant moral principle
in scholarly discussions of ethics in the past 15 years.

This was partially because we

came to realize the evils of the medical paternalism of the Hippocratic tradition (which urges
a physician to do what he or she thinks would be most beneficial to a patient even if it
violates the patient's wishes) and partially in recognition of differing values in our

pluralistic society. (Who am I to say what is right for another person?) It is partiaUy based
on the philosophy of Kant, who stated that we have a moral duty to treat people as ends,
never as means. The fact that we have true freedom of choice is more important than the
consequences of that freedom. This idea can be supported theologically.
The principle of autonomy recognizes the rights and personal dignity ofindividuals

and provides fundamental protection against abuses of church and state authority.
Autonomy is valued particularly in the historical American tradition of moral freedom and

independence. Some have recently criticized our placing autonomy, unchallenged, at the
top of our moral priorities, reminding us that human beings are not totally independent
(autonomous in a slightly different sense)creatures and that morality and personhood itself

only have meaning in the context of community with others.15 We are "obligate social
creatures. Daniel Callahan recommends "Autonomy should be a moral good,not a moral
obsession. It is a value, not the value. [It is]... a necessary but not a sufficient condition

for a moral life."16 I share this view, and while strongly valuing autonomy, also limit it by
considering other values (see Justice).

Those strictly defining autonomy for use in medical ethics insist that autonomy,to
truly exist, must have two essential features: freedom from coercion, and rational

deliberation.17 Based on the latter, young children and mentally ill persons have
traditionally been excluded from those considered to be truly autonomous. A person who
is not able to deliberate rationally is referred to as incompetent Important to our discussion

of childbulh alternatives is Eric Cassell's contention that illness compromises autonomy.1^
We appropriately question whether a person is truly autonomous(free and rational) when
he or she makes a choice which is "out of character." James Childressl^ thinks

paternalism may be justified under such conditions. Physicians have been thanked on
many occasions by patients for overriding their pleas during a crisis after the crisis is over.

Labor and delivery is not a disease. But physicians may justify some paternalistic
behavior based on the idea that it is. Those who have witnessed many births must admit
that women seem at times to not be "their rational selves" during labor and delivery.
Cassell s recommendation still holds, however: "the primary function of medicine is to
preserve, repair and to restore the patient's autonomy."20 This function can be well served

by childbirth preparation, allowing a woman to feel that she is in control throughout labor
and delivery, and avoiding intrusions into her privacy. Childbirth attendants should not be

able to get away with citing the "incompetent due to irrationality" defense for their
paternalism when they, in part, may have caused it.

Justice

Daniel Callahan,in criticizing autonomy as a sufficient value for the moral life,

states There can be no community without a powerful sense that my neighbor is my
obligation, quite apart from whether I choose that obligation or noL"21 This is a good
point, but I oppose the implication that valuing autonomy necessarily leads to isolationism.
He uses the example of Kitty Genovese, who had not contracted with her neighbors that

they should call the police in the event that she would be attacked. But there is no logical
presumption that calling the police would be against her will. We may presume to do well

to another unless it violates their expressed wishes. We can exhibit a whole range of moral
obligations to our neighbors, most of which are welcomed, but how are we being
beneficient to them if we are ignoring what they find beneficial?

Justice concerns the distribution of good. It can be seen as the ethical principle that
regulates the expression of beneficence. Justice asks,"what do I owe my neighbor?" My
answer is that we owe our neighbor beneficence,22 so long as we remember to use the

recipient s idea of what is good rather than our own. Doing so respects the autonomy of
others. This is using autonomy as a "side constraint" in the words of Gerald Dworkin.23

Justice also asks,"who is my neighbor?" In partial answer to this question, let us consider
Henry Sidgwick's Principal of Justice which states.

It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong
for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different
individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or
circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for
difference of treatment.2^

In ethical discussions involving pregnancy, we have a dilemma: the woman and

fetus are so intimately associated that we cannot interact with one party without affecting
the other. If the fetus is my neighbor and I am to be beneficent to it, and the mother is my
neighbor and I am to be beneficent to her, what breaks the deadlock if there is a conflict of

interest? To my way of thinking, Sidgwick's rule helps solve the dilemma. I find a
difference between the natures of mothers and even term fetuses which is reasonable

ground for difference of treatment. We have already noted that young children, and

therefore certainly term fetuses,lack characteristics needed to possess autonomy. Whereas
a person's skin color or gender do not constitute grounds for different moral treatment, the

possession of autonomy does seem to have moral significance. If we regard the mother's
wishes when we treat her beneficially, we do not violate her autonomy. But neither do we
violate the autonomy of the fetus, for it has none.
RELATED ETHICAL ISSUES

Abortion

The longstanding debate over the morality of pregnancy termination helps illuminate
the discussion of the ethics of childbirth alternatives. The similarity between the two issues

is that they both involve the conflict of interest(possible in childbirth alternatives) between
a woman and her fetus. The value of parental autonomy is weighed against the value of
fetal life. The difference between the two situations is the difference in the likelihood of

fetal death resulting from the free exercise of maternal autonomy. The likelihood of fetal

death from pregnancy termination during the first two trimesters approaches 100%. The
likelihood of fetal death from any given selection of childbirth alternatives is small. This
affects our impression of maternal intent and disposition towards her fetus.

In our society, mothers have been allowed full expression of their autonomy above
the interests of the fetus throughout most of pregnancy since the 1973 Roe vs. Wade

decision. Many do not understand that the purpose of abortion, as defended by the Roe vs.
Wade decision, is not to kill fetuses.25 The death of fetuses is a consequence of that
action. The decision was argued constitutionally on the basis of a woman's right to do as

she wishes with her body (here to rid it of the fetus). The court expressed the opinion that
the state has an interest in fetal life also. Thus,if the fetus is able to live outside of the

womb (i.e. has extrauterine viability) and the mother can be rid of it simultaneously, both

interests of the state are satisfied. But before the fetus possesses extrauterine viability, the
mother's interest, by virtue of its mutual exclusiveness with fetal life, takes precedence. If
someone kills a fetus which possesses extrauterine viability, it is considered infanticide.

This is why abortion is, for practical considerations, an issue of only the first two

trimesters of pregnancy. An abortion of pregnancy in the third trimester is a delivery, and
does not have the ethical significance of abortion as we commonly think of it when fetal

death is assumed. We are now faced with a new field: "third trimester ethics." During this
period, we have a fetus that could exist independently from its mother. Therefore, her
autonomy and infant life are not mutually exclusive as in the abortion debate. We now

discuss risk-benefit ratios of potential life and death, not certainties of life and death. We
recognize, however,that it is best for fetuses in terms of their health and chances for
survival to remain within the maternal environment until term.
Proxy Representation

A problem common to ethical discussions involving fetuses, infants and even
young children is that these parties are unable to speak on behalf of their own interests. In

our legal and economic systems, we have long recognized the custom of proxy
representation in situations where a party influenced by a decision cannot take part in
making that decision. Proxy representatives for fetuses in discussions of how they should

be treated disagree, however,over the actual interests fetuses might have (which they are
merely unable to articulate), or whether they have particular interests at all.

There are those in the debates of abortion and the treatment of defective newboms,
who conceptualize and defend the interest of the fetus or infant as having "the right to life."

There are others who claim that unwanted and defective fetuses might not choose life if

they had a choice, reminding us of the fact that certain adults claim a "right to die" and of
the emerging ethical concept of"wrongful life." They reason if adults have different

interests and values which morally demand differential treatment, why should fetuses and
infants be approached differently?

Indeed, we have already legally addressed this sort of claim. In 1977, the

Massachusettes Supreme Court rendered a decision regarding the medical treatment of a

profoundly retarded man named Joseph Saikewicz. Saikewicz was deemed incompetent to
make a decision on his own behalf as to whether he would receive chemotherapy for
cancer. The court recognized the right of a patient to decline medical treatment and further

said "...if such a right exists for the competent patient, it must and does for the

incompetent..."26 Essentially the same conclusion was reached by the New Jersey
Supreme Court regarding Karen Quinlan. Numerous decisions since have recognized that
an incompetent person may not be assumed, under certain circumstances, to desire specific
medical care. Determination of whether someone is truly competent to make decisions is

one of the knottiest problems of ethics. Fortunately we are notfaced with that problem in
this discussion because fetuses and infants do not meet even minimum criteria for
competence.27

Is a person automatically considered incompetent(not autonomous)by reason of
"not deliberating rationally" if they want to die? The case of Elizabeth Bouvia28 brings this

point into focus, though it also involves the moral question of whether she had the right to
enlist the aid of others in achieving her death wish. It is difficult to say whether there is
such a thing as "rational suicide," and the opposing arguments of that debate will not be

repeated here, but it is not generally considered irrational to risk death for some other good.
Could not a fetus be represented by proxy as having the disposition to take some such
risks?

We do not know what interests to attribute to a fetus. We can only guess. It seems
that everyone has the tendency to project their own interests and values onto the fetus.

Who can reliably be taken to speak on its behalf? No one is unbiased. One who serves as
a proxy representative should try, as nearly as possible, to put himself in the circumstances
of the one he represents rather than his own circumstances. This is where factual

information can be helpful in assessing the credibility of a proxy position. For instance, it
was credible that Mr. Saikewicz might decline chemotherapy. Many competent people do
likewise, depending on their prognosis. Similarly, the risks a fetus might credibly be
represented to choose would vary with its circumstances.

Consider the case of a fetus with no known anomalies in a low risk pregnancy. Is

it clear that such a fetus would have its proxy representative vote for hospital delivery?
Under these circumstances, according to the factual analysis of the first portion of this

discussion, this fetus faces roughly equal chances of death whether bom in a hospital or in
a home setting. But a hospital delivery is more likely to be traumatic. Would the fetus, if
rational, necessarily opt for the scalp electrode of internal fetal monitoring, entry into a
bright, cold room and a high probability ofimmediate separation from its mother? Even if
it had to consider an additional risk of one death in a thousand, is it not plausible that the

fetus might accept such a risk if by doing so it could anticipate a welcome of low lighting,
music, a family gathering and being put to its mother's breast in the home setting?
What if the case were that of a fetus with no anomalies in a high risk pregnancy?
Under these circumstances, a proxy representation that a fetus would choose a hospital
birth seems most credible. But in the case of a fetus with an anomaly (depending on the
anomaly), it might be plausible for a proxy representative to claim that the fetus would

choose an option removed from medical intervention out of a "right to die" with similarities

to the situations of Saikewicz, Quinlan and Bouvia. Critics of this final point of view may
say that because we cannot be certain that such a fetus would choose death, we should

"give it the benefit of the doubt" and preserve life if at all possible. But is there a "benefit

of the doubt ? Let us consider that if people will to die in many situations of hardship(and
many do), how much easier it is to wish that one had never been bom (which is essentially
the case here).

A good proxy representative should not only consider the circumstances of his

incompetent party, but should also strive to represent the values of that party. If proxy
representation were needed on behalf of an adult who,through a serious accident,came to

be in a persistent vegetative state, one could appeal to that person's life record for evidence
of his values. We can not do this with fetuses. The theoretical argument can be raised that
proxy representation of a fetus could be based on values it is most likely to acquire with

maturation. Do we have any basis on which to guess what these values might be? I feel
we do. Our understanding of sociology strongly supports the assumption that it is likely
to, more or less, adopt the values of the family into which it is raised.

This,I feel, can be used as an argument for allowing parents to make decisions on

behalf of their progeny. Furthermore,it can be tested by an examination of parental values.
That is, if parents applied a different set of values to fetal treatment than the values they
held regarding their own treatment, the credibility of their proxy representation could be
questioned. When others step in claiming to represent the interest of a fetus as against the
interests of its parents, this is taking advantage of the neutrality of the fetus. We may not
like the values of another person, but in our society we discharge the role and duty of
instiUing values into a new member of that society to families. If we do not like the values

with which someone raises their child, we can attempt to change their mind, but we should
not simply usurp their prerogative to instill those values.

Parental Autonomy

Who should decide what childbirth options should be open and which is to be

chosen for each particular pregnancy? I argue that it should be the woman who is bearing
the child. Whose place is it to dictate where, how and with whom she may have her baby?
The question is posed for the sake of those who are concerned for potential abuses of such

unrestricted power (against the interests of the fetus). Four arguments to support the
position that the childbearing woman should be afforded full autonomy in this matter are
presented below. The potential for abuse of this right will be discussed later under the
heading child abuse.

The first argument for allowing women to bear children as they wish is that society
at large saddles parents with liability for their children for many years after birth. Parents,

and mothers in particular in our society, far more than any other person or group in society
bear the consequences of their childbearing venture. How can society force a woman,for
any reason, to bear her child in a specific way and then make her live with the potential

negative consequences of that action? Let us keep in mind there are no childbirth options
with no potential negative consequences.

It is in the best interests of society to be able to hold individuals morally, legally and
economically responsible. If childbearers are allowed to choose freely between childbirth
alternatives, only then can they be held responsible for the consequences to their children.

And if they are held responsible, they will have a strong natural incentive to choose wisely.
But if childbearers are not allowed to choose freely in this matter, they might rightly deny
responsibility for certain later actions of those children because childbirth affects the life of
the child and family interactions profoundly.

The second argument notes that women who bear children are risk takers who spare
the rest of us the inconvenience, body changes and risks to life and health of pregnancy and
birth. We would not like a society that forced women to take such risks against their wills.

Yet society needs new members. It relies on the fact that women are wiUing to freely
accept those risks. Surely their willingness to take any risks at all justifies allowing them to
decide specifically what risks they will take.

Thirdly, pregnant women are unavoidably physically affected by any course of
action that affects their fetus and their bodily rights are at least equally important to respect
and maintain as those of the fetus. As it turns out,fortunately most maternal instincts of

self preservation work to the advantage of the fetus also. Conversely, most courses of

action harmful to the term fetus would probably be harmful to the mother. Can we expect a
woman to treat her fetus any better than she treats herself? There are rare cases, however,

where the health interests of mother and fetus are not one in the same. They will be
discussed under Parent-Fetus Conflict of Interest.

The fourth argument is that mothers are usually the persons most likely to have the
best interests of their child most at heart "Mother love" cannot be generated by the state or
its agencies. Likewise,the powerful protective instincts of mothers cannot be legislated
away. If women feel forced to go to the hospital to deliver and then discover that not

everything done there is in the best interests of themselves or their fetus/infant, they will
notjust be angry. They are likely to feel that they have betrayed their fundamental maternal

duty to protect their child! For most, no authority can supercede this conviction. Placing
the locus of control for decisions regarding childbirth closest to this powerful motivator
will probably best insure the well being of the fetus/infant It seems safer to trust in this
instinct than in decisions of policy makers removed from such direct and intimate
involvement.

Parent-Fetus Conflict of Interest

If we make it a primafacie duty to grant those who bear children full freedom to

decide how, where and with whom they will deliver, what shall we do with the occasional

case of obvious abuse of this right? Have we no obligation to protect the fetus from

parental indiscretion? It is ironic that currently in our culture, the fetal entity is not
protected from the consequences of parental autonomy during early pregnancy (though
there is a large group strongly pressing for such protection) and yet child protection

agencies can deprive parents of any control over the same entity(now called an infant) very
soon after birth.

Our discussion of"third trimester ethics" highlights the conflicting values of
various segments of our society regarding the standing and treatment of the fetus/infant.

There is an increasing trend in our culture to treat the unborn as a full member of society
who therefore deserves full protection under the law. As far back as 1959, the United

Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child stated that the child "...needs special
safeguards and...legal protection before as well as after birth..."29 Others, with equal
fervor, defend the right of women to abortion and the rights of the pregnant patient. These
rights" may be mutually exclusive, depending on the definition of the word "child" (as,
for example,expanded to include those before birth in the U.N. statement above).
The concept of parent-fetus conflict of interest is already being tested in the courts.
In 1975, a Denver woman was forced by court order to undergo a cesarean section for the
protection of her fetus, which was judged to be "a dependent and neglected child within the

meaning of the Colorado Children's Code."30 There was good evidence offetal distress,
but the 350 pound woman also faced significant risk from the procedure and refused to
sign the consent. A psychiatrist determined that she was competent to make a decision in
the matter, and she was also well aware of the personal consequences of abdominal

surgery, having already undergone two gallbladder-related operations during the
pregnancy.

Another court order was obtained in Georgia to force a woman to submit to a
cesarean section if she presented to the hospital. (The order was obtained while the woman

remained outside of the hospital, based on her statements of intention.) The grounds for
the order were that the fetus faced a 99% chance of death due to a complete placenta previa
if the woman did not have a cesarean section. This condition,routinely and well remedied

by cesarean delivery, also significantly endangers the lives of women if vaginal delivery is
attempted. Again, the court said "the intrusion involved... is outweighed by the duty of
the state to protect a living, unborn human being..."31 Interestingly, the woman delivered
vaginally a few days later without incident.

Yet another court order in Chicago gave temporary custody of a fetus to a hospital
lawyer,forced the mother to undergo cesarean section, and then reinstated custody ofthe
child to its parents.32 And in Los Angeles, a woman who refused to consent to a cesarean
section for the distress of her fetus was simply taken to surgery against her will by
attending physicians who did not consult with the judicial system at all.33 Other cases
discussed in the ethical literature involve court ordered maternal blood transfusion and
forced hospitalization for the management of maternal diabetes for the sake offetal
protection.34

In these cases we see precedents of noteworthy concern for the weU being of

unborn children. But where is the concern for the well being of the mother? Sociologist
Barbara Rothman is concerned that as medical and legal interest in fetuses increases,
women may come to be viewed as "vessels" without basic legal rights of bodily integrity.
She portrays a scenario of 25 years hence where a woman is told by her attorneys "...The
conditions to which she must adhere throughout pregnancy..." in order to avoid being
committed to a high security maternity ward or having her fetus surgically removed from
her and placed in an artificial womb.35 WiU maternal consent be required, or will it be
ignored,if fetal surgery becomes commonplace?

Ethics and law professor George Annas notes that in these cases a great deal of
emphasis is placed on the accuracy of medical prognostication (which proved wrong,for

example, in the Georgia case). His concern is that the courts, in relying on physician
judgment as to the degree of fetal danger,"...may simply be giving them a license to
perform cesarean sections whenever they want to, without regard to the pregnant woman's
desires."36

These cases reveal the fact that, as fetal understanding and prenatal treatment for

fetal problems advance, physicians are increasingly viewing the fetus as a separate patient.
Obstetricians, who used to simply attend to the needs of pregnant women,are now
perplexed by potentially competing interests of two patients. And there is no way around

it. Anything that could possibly be done to a fetus medically affects the mother bodily.
Some seem to wish that humans were bom from eggs,like baby chicks,so we could get
them without violating the mother.

Perhaps a look at the nature of human reproduction, in which we are not hatched

from eggs, will be helpful. Is it possible that modem society is making a false distinction
between mother and fetus? While there are ways in which the fetus can be properly
recognized as "other," in many ways it remains part of its mother. It is completely
contained and maintained by the mother's body, similarly to her other organs. Her immune
system does not treat it as "other" and reject it. Genetically it is "other," but even half of

this is her. The significant feature of"othemess" with which we are concemed is the
separate, developing fetal mind. We are not referring to the autonomic functions of the

brain so much as the thought content and sensation appreciation functions of a separate
mind. And we do not even know how much thought a fetus may possess or even how to
measure it. But even the thought content of the fetus, as it progresses through extra-uterine
hfe, will largely become the thought content of the mother,imparted as she interacts with it.
(Some "umbilical cords" are not cut until long after birth.)

For practical puiposes, the mother and her fetus can be treated as a singular unit.
This unit is under the control of the matemal brain. We face a strong temptation to deal

with the fetus as a separate unit, but it is not yet ours to "do with." Some say it is not the
mother's to do with as she pleases,either--but who more than she? We will never develop
an incubator as good (either physiologically or psychologically) as the maternal womb. It
will always be the gold standard as breast milk is to formula manufacturers. If we want to

affect fetal well being, nature tells us we must go through the mother by affecting her weU
being. Doing this requires maternal consent. And mothers can refuse medical treatment
just like anyone else.

The objection is raised that a pregnant woman's refusal to avail herself of medical
treatment affects the fetus. This is true,just as a mother of grown children affects them if

she refuses life saving treatment. They will suffer losses if she dies when she might have
lived, but her bodily rights take precedence over their financial and emotional needs. We

might expect most mothers to donate an organ in hopes of saving the life of their child, but
we do not require such sacrificial behavior by law. Why should a woman,then, have to

submit to a cesarean section against her will for the sake of her fetus? As George Annas
asks Do we really want to restrain,forcibly medicate, and operate on a competent,
refusmg adult?'37 Dq we especially want to do this when benefit to the fetus is not
absolutely certain?

As a practical matter, how could such measures for the supposed benefit offetuses

be implemented? Would not fear of this kind of treatment keep women away from medical
assistance (even that which they would have sought otherwise)to the greater potential
detriment offetuses? If we protect the autonomy of childbearing women,some fetuses will
probably die that would not have died due to certain choices they may make. But the cost

of not permitting them this freedom appears to be much greater. This is true not only in
terms of the potential horrors of"conscripted childbearing" but also in terms of the interests

offetuses in general,for it is doubtful that the state, if it dictated all birth behavior, would
find itself responsible for less perinatal morbidity and mortality.

Child Abuse

The question remains "Have we no obligation to protect the fetus from the

occasional, obvious case of parental indiscretion?" In the light of the strong arguments

above for resolutely maintaining the autonomy of childbearing women,it seems that any
such case would have to be flagrantly offensive—on the order offorcing a competent
woman to undergo surgery against her will. Let us envision the development of a drug that
could kill a third trimester fetus without permanently harming the mother. Could we not
prosecute a woman taking such a drug for "infanticide in utero?" Should we prosecute the

pregnant cocaine user for child abuse in utero?" What about the practice of delivering
babies under water?

Let us approach these questions after developing an understanding of the general

subject of child abuse. Child abuse is difficult to define. We can nearly all agree that
certain brutal acts cannot be justified by parental authority and constitute child abuse. But

some behaviors that would be criminal if perpetrated on strangers are accepted within the

family context. An example is corporal punishment. A vigorous spanking is acceptable if
the recipient is one's son. If the recipient is the 78 year old woman next door, one has
committed assault and battery. Yet if someone does permanent damage to their son in
punishing him, they may be convicted of child abuse.

Most definitions of child abuse proscribe specific, overt actions which are

considered excessive by community standards. An appropriate concern for humane

treatment of children has prompted a widening of the functions of child protection agencies
to prosecute for child neglect also. But neglect is even harder to define. Acts of omission

are the subject of child neglect. But people differ widely in their opinions of what minimal
care parents should provide.

lUinois state statutes define neglect as "failure to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare."38 California defines child

neglect as "to be placed in such situations that its person or health is endangered."39 These
definitions leave us with the problem of defining such subjective terms as "reasonable,"
"welfare," "health" and "endangered." Many states do not attempt to defme the terms
abuse and neglect at all, forcing courts to determine on a case by case basis whether there is
validity to someone s allegations of parental indiscretion. Social caseworkers, medical
personnel and police officers influence the court as expert witnesses and judges are
permitted the judicial flexibility" to make actual determinations of neglect.
According to authors Giovannini and Becerra child mistreatment "is not an absolute

entity but,rather is socially defined and cannot be divorced from the social contexts in

which it occurs."40 what we in the United States might call neglect may be relatively good
care compared to the standards and conditions of third world countries. Yet we have poor
and uneducated segments of our society also. Who determines the minimum requirements
to be a fit parent? On a practical basis, this determination is made by the groups above
(caseworkers, pediatricians,judges, etc.). It is interesting that those judging neglect are
usually not in the same socioeconomic group as those they judge. Nevertheless,

Giovannini and Becerra, after polling the opinions of these professionals regarding nine
categories of child mistreatment,found "failure to provide" to be considered less serious
and more socioeconomically defined than the other categories of mistreatment.

The discussion of child abuse and neglect have direct bearing on our discussion of
the ethics of childbirth alternatives. In 1977, the Executive Director of the American

College of Obstetrics and Gynecology referred to home delivery as "child abuse" in an

issue of the AGOG newsletter.41 Obstetricians and neonatologists probably generally hold
this view and assume that fetuses would, if they could, choose hospital birth under thencare and that parental decisions to choose other alternatives must "unfortunately for the

baby be tolerated. A 1978 ACOG news release said "79 babies died last year in California
associated with home delivery that would not have died in hospitals" in support of the

contention that home delivery constitutes child neglecL42 jhis statistical citing, however,
has been widely criticized as misleading,for examination of health department data revealed
that at least two thirds of these deaths occurred in unplanned and unintentional out-of-

hospital births. Many of the women involved were trying to get to the hospital.
Furthermore, many people view the interventions of hospital, physician attended
birth as child abuse which must "unfortunately for the baby" be tolerated. Some see

application of the fetal scalp electrode as abusive. Others have poignantly presented the
case of their premature newborn who they felt was literally being tortured by neonatal

intensive care procedures without their consent and against their wiU because they lost aU
control over their child in the hospital setting.^3 Those promoting alternatives to hospital,
physician attended childbirth do not argue their position out of a concern for maternal
autonomy as much as they do out of concern for the well being of the fetus/infant.44

These are the same people who have pioneered unmedicated childbirth and techniques to
enhance bonding and who emphasize breastfeeding all for the sake of babies.

Protection can mean different things to different people according to their values.
Protection from pain and suffering may be in conflict with protection from death. We must

seriously question labeling as "abusive" or "neglectful" alternatives which obviously
concerned and educated parents choose for their children. A neglectful parent is one who
does not care, not someone who cares deeply but does not agree with another's ideas of

what is good and beneficial. It certainly seems possible that an obviously concerned and

reasonable parent could justify exposing their child to some risks in hopes of attaining a
higher good for them.

We must remember that all parents are not "obviously concerned" for the well being
of their child, however, before and after birth. Many pregnancies though not aborted, are

nevertheless unwanted. Is it not possible that some people would choose home birth in

hopes the baby would die? Yes, this is possible. And unattended home births may warrant
the investigation of child protection agencies for this reason. But willful harm to fetuses

and infants can occur regardless of the chosen childbirth alternative. Many women
continue to smoke cigarettes as they see their obstetrician weekly. And a newborn just
discharged from a university medical center can easily be starved to death once home.
Home birth may allow for abuse, but it should not be assumed to assure it.

Abuse is active. Child abuse merely applies laws regarding the active mistreatment

of others to chOdren,except for a few exempted cases culturaUy defined as within parental
discretion (e.g. corporal punishment). Therefore, third trimester feticide in utero warrants

prosecution. Why, by this reasoning, does not abortion warrant prosecution? It does not
because abortion is based on a woman's right to rid herself of the fetus, not to kill it. It
dies because it cannot maintain a separate existence. If the state can demonstrate a will to

harm a third trimester fetus, and can clearly distinguish this from taking a risk that may
result m fetal harm,it may be justified in prosecuting the mother for fetal injury. May the
state then forcibly separate the fetus from the mother in such a case (i.e. order a cesarean

section)? In my opinion, the answer is "no," based on arguments above that this degree of
personal invasion constitutes an even greater crime,especially if based on the mere threat of
taking a feticidal piU.

Delivering an infant under water appears to be active abuse,tantamount to

drownmg any other child who needs air to live, unless there is some proposed benefit, or
precedent in nature, used to justify under water birthing. Who can suspect that the infant
wiU not almost certainly be harmed? It seems appropriate to suspect and investigate a
parental will to harm the infant in such cases. The pregnant cocaine abuser,on the other

hand, may have no will to harm the fetus, though she certainly does. Her addiction may be
even stronger than her desire to discontinue the drug use for her own sake. She might be

appropriately considered neglectful though,if she refused help in overcoming her
addiction. And in this case, consideration offorced cesarean section to remove the fetus

from the harmful effects ofcocaine may not even be in the best interests of the fetus, due to
the superiority of the uterus (even if somewhat compromised)to the external environment.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE

Human beings group themselves together into societies to provide benefits that they
cannot attain for themselves individually. One of these benefits, or functions of the state, is
public protection. Ethics has long been concerned with the tension between the freedom of

individuals and the restrictions of society at large for general benefit. Laws prohibiting
drunk driving and the inappropriate disposal of toxic waste protect us collectively while
limiting the freedom of individuals. Some of these restrictions on personal freedom

involve our health. Schools require proof of immunization for entrance, but this impinges
on a child s personal freedom to avoid injections. The required reporting of sexually
transmitted diseases protects others at the expense of one individual's privacy.
If the state can require that a woman subject her child to an immunization injection
(which poses the risk of a rare, but significant adverse reaction), why can it not dictate

what she must do to protect her child at birth? The main answer is that immunizations help
protect other children. The state does not require that its members take affirmative action to
protect their own health. The extent to which parents are required to take affirmative action
to protect their own children, and how far before birth, are addressed above.

The state has not only taken on a protective role in health matters. In the U.S., the
state has also taken on the role of providing at least a minimum level of care for all of its

citizens. It does this through the massive funding of various aid programs and health
department services at all levels of government. We may assume that the state is interested

in providing that minimum level of care demanded by its constituents at the lowest possible

price. Though many people seem to think that money should not have anything to do with
"doing what is right," economic considerations have important ethical impact This is due
to the unavoidable fact that resources are finite. Financial resources used inefficiently in
one area leave less for the benefit of others elsewhere.

We have noted that several childbuth alternatives are less expensive than the typical,
U.S. hospital based, physician attended birth, while at the same time, under proper
circumstance, providing equal safety. Why then does the government not promote these
alternatives? Presumably, partially because it reflects public ignorance of the facts on the

subject and partially because lawmakers are influenced by the powerful lobbying efforts of

organized medicine.45 The state, by utiUzing its other health related roles oflicensing and
regulating, could alter this situation.

Of course the state does not want to merely save money in providing care if

disasters thereby result and cause greater expense in the long run. And the state not only
has a financial interest in the outcomes of pregnancy and birth, but it also reflects the

community consensus of moral interest in those affected by birth practices. Finally, as we

have seen, the state has interests in preserving the liberty of its citizens and maintaining the
family unit as the locus of responsibility for children. Several suggestions are offered
below for ways in which the state can simultaneously promote its various interests:

improving maternal and fetal health without expending a greater amount of financial
resources, and without significantly limiting individual freedom or family responsibility.
The first of these suggestions is that the state strongly encourage and facilitate the
objective verification of the claims of various childbirth alternatives. This could be done in

part by funding scientific research by economically disinterested parties. It could also make
sure that health care policy making panels are interdisciplinary to avoid biases of
interpretation of the data.

This is related to the second suggestion that the state more assiduously observe its
duty to watch for monopolies and the restraint of free trade in health care. If the

government were to license more midwives and freestanding birth centers, while requiring
all childbirth attendants and enterprises to carefully report their statistical outcomes,each
alternative could produce a safety profile of public record. The state could make this

information available as a basis for consumers to make a responsible choice. Licensing
would fulfill its protective role of verifying and standardizing the quality of care claimed by
each provider or setting. The increased competition should bring costs down as well.
Thirdly, the state could increase its efforts in the distribution of resources such as

food, prenatal care and education, known to decrease perinatal morbidity and mortality
regardless of the specific childbirth alternative chosen. If such resources were provided,it
would be easier to identity whether a parent was actually neglectful or merely a victim of
circumstances.

Finally, the state can appropriately investigate and even prosecute alleged harmful
behavior towards the fetus/infant, but not under the prejudicial assumption that certain
options, such as home birth, are de facto abusive (as some have suggested^^). The same

principles used in the determination of abuse and neglect should be applied equally to all
childbirth alternatives. It should be noted whether any specific harm or risk to the

fetus/infant is related to an intention of bringing about some other good, or whether it is
merely capricious or habitual. The state should certainly not penalize people for their self
education, motivation and preparation if this leads to a nonstandard childbirth alternative

choice. This is just the kind of personal responsibility society wants to encourage.
THE ROLE OF PHYSICIANS

If there is so much good evidence for the comparable safety and additional benefits

of other childbirth alternatives, why does the orthodox medical community not change its

practices to conform with the findings of studies in its own publications? I do not believe

physicians fail to do so primanly because they are motivated by greed for money,a desire
to subjugate and manipulate women,or to get out onto the golf course, as they are accused
of in some childbirth alternatives literature.^^ Most physicians sincerely believe they have
their patients best interest at heart. Some possible explanations for their behavior follow.

Perhaps physicians cannot believe the findings. They generally seem to have a

fundamental belief in the goodness of technology. New technology has been applied
throughout the history of medicine with remarkable, positive results. Perhaps they do not
recognize that something may be different here: birth is not an iUness. Everywhere else,
the application of technology usually helps. When labor and delivery are functioning free
of pathology, technology, however, may only disrupt things.

Physicians want to be helpful. A physician's philosophical bent is not to just stand
by and let nature take its course. If they generally did that, they would be of no use to their
patients. They typically feel that nature "needs a hand," and they are traditionally
sanctioned by society and requested by individuals to give it one.
Thirdly, tradition is a strong force in the field of medicine. There is so much to be

known,that for practical purposes,each new generation of physicians accepts much of
what is taught on faith. Questioning each point is like "re-inventing the wheel." Often,
medical facts are difficult to prove,so inertia holds sway until a preponderance of evidence
absolutely refutes a dogma. And conformity is pressured into medical students and
residents.

Physicians are no more anxious to be shown that they are wrong than anyone else.
This is especially true because many physicians fear that they wiU be sued if they admit that
the way they did something in the past was erroneous by the new standard they might
adopt. Unfortunately, physicians are judged in court by "the standard of care," which is a

kind of average of the practices of other physicians in the community. This practice tends

to promote the perpetuation of error. Some "standard" practices are not optimal. But it is

dangerous for a doctor to venture out on his own and base his practice on a logical
argument or data not yet accepted by the medical community at large.
Lastly, it is difficult to change just one isolated practice in what has become the

typical hospital deliveiy and demonstrate benefit. A study which compared hospital
deliveries alike in eveiy other way except that one group would have episiotomies, and the

other group would not, might show relative benefit from the procedure. But another study,
in which the second variable of birth position (lithotomy versus upright) was changed at the
same time, might show relative detriment from the procedure. The "technological daisy
chain" mitigates against the evolutionary change of hospital obstetrics. Medicine is hard

pressed to change so many variables at once to demonstrate an improvement in outcomes.
Consideration of the "technological daisy chain" leads us to a discussion of the

plight of today's physicians and hospitals. Simply put, both are being charged with
responsibility for things for which they cannot be responsible. They are liable for

negligence if their surveillance fails to detect a correctable problem, but they can be sued for
complications arising from techniques used to better their surveillance. Many of the
determinants of birth outcome are completely out of their control and in the control of the

mother. Nevertheless, the physician feels he will be held responsible for the outcome(and
he will if it is negative) and so will attempt to control as many variables affecting that
outcome as possible. A power struggle often ensues, and this is also to his disadvantage,
for hostility increases the chances of a lawsuit. Likewise, a woman in labor demanding
pain medication could become hostile, and even charge inhumane treatment,if her
physician refused to give it for the sake of the fetus. Yet if the fetus does have a
complication from the medication, he is liable.

If health care consumers expect health care providers to "first do no harm," they
must not be allowed to hold them responsible for the consequences of non-intervention.

The concept of negligence has been carried too far in our present legal system. The most
effective way to do no harm is to do no good. Conversely,consumers and the courts need

to recognize the fact that whenever one acts in a positive way to intervene for good,there is
a possibility that that action will have negative consequences. When people request
intervention, they should bear much of the responsibility for the consequences.
Moreover, physicians face differing expectations from each of the women they
attend. Some wish to take more responsibility for their actions and requests, some less.

And some change their mind under various circumstances when it is to their advantage.

Physicians, having experienced this, remain self-protective. A lack of clear understanding
in the public about the impossible,"no win" situations in which they place physicians,
liable every way they turn, has helped make obstetrics one of the most dangerous fields of
medicine in terms of litigation.48

Ironically, physicians who attend birth may be raising their liability and chances of
being sued even higher by restricting other childbirth alternatives. In most fields of

medicine, people come to the doctor out of a strong personal motivation. The physician

addresses their need and they are thankful. They usually think they are better off than they
would have been had they not sought medical care. But childbearing women who feel that

they have essentially no choice but to go to the hospital and submit to the authority of a
physician, rather than being compelled by a sense of need, may be hostile from the onset-

looking for occasions to demonstrate their power. This is especially true when they are
told what they may or may not do regarding an act for which they feel responsible.
Modem medicine needs to consider how personal and emotional childbirth is. It is

not just like having one's gallbladder removed (which is also quite personal and
emotional). Women feel an unalienable responsibility to protect their fetus, and their

sexuality is also involved here. Why should it be easy for women to literally uncover their
bodies to strangers and allow internal examinations in the medical setting when it would be

unthinkable for them to do so under any other conditions? Where else is a woman expected
to relinquish her instinct to keep her baby from the prodding of others? Granted that

society has made it acceptable for physicians acting in their role to get so personal, it may
nonetheless be difficult for women to accept these intrusions. It seems to be in the better

interest of physicians to stand ready to serve at the point where a woman's other
motivations overcome these.

No where else in medicine has the role of physicians become so paternalistic.
Perhaps this is because interventions are usually justified by arguments that the fetus will

benefit and most mothers respond to this. But in other fields of medicine, practice is
dictated more by patient desire. For instance, it is noteworthy that there is no required
consent form to sign to allow episiotomy, amniotomy and internal monitoring,though each
of these procedures are more invasive than a number of other hospital procedures for which

informed consent is mandatory. Anywhere else in medicine,such procedures require
disclosure of the potential risks and an opportunity to decline based on the patient's
evaluation of the risk-benefit ratio.

Physicians might become less indignant that many women want to deliver in

settings other than the hospital and under the care of midwives if they considered these
facts. Since physicians will not attend deliveries outside of the hospital, nor on the terms
of the mother, and midwives are often barred from providing these alternatives, mothers
often feel faced with an all-or-nothing choice. If they sign into the hospital, they may feel
that they are signing away their personal rights and decision making power over how their
labor and delivery will be managed, and signing a sort of general consent for a whole
package of procedures which need not be explained or justified.

If physicians and hospitals are truly concerned for the well being of both mother

and infant, it is up to them to address the problem that parents feel such a profound loss of
control under their care. It is reasonable to assume that some people stay away from the

orthodox medical obstetrical system to the detriment of themselves and/or their infant

because this is the only way they can avoid certain features of birth encountered there. It is

incumbent on physicians to show the benefit of their techniques, to attract patients to want
those benefits out of a natural motivation,rather than coercing them by insuring there are
no altematives. Because of the way physicians practice, they virtually never spend an
entire labor with their patient. Yet if they cannot,or will not, they should not stand in the
way of midwives who are willing to do so, and for a lower fee.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The first half of this thesis, a presentation offactual information about childbirth,

though lengthy and technical at times, has been indispensable to an ethical analysis of
childbirth alternatives. A most basic ethical concern of this discussion is the concern for

safety. Various groups vehemently oppose each other in claiming their alternatives are

safest and this contradiction must be sorted out. The problem of determining which
alternatives in childbirth are safest is, in part, a problem of the interpretation of factual
information. As is true of the analysis of any data, the conditions under which a

phenomenon takes place must be considered when interpreting its consequences. To do
otherwise is to make invalid comparisons. Note the situation defining conditions of the
conclusions reached below.

It is commonly believed in the U.S. that home birth, even ifjustifiable on other
grounds, is not as safe as hospital birth. But if home births are planned, screened as low

risk, and appropriately attended, there is significant evidence that they may be as safe or
even safer than low-risk hospital births. The North Carolina study, cited above,supports
this conclusion. If a good system of back-up obstetrical care and transport were applied as
it is in the Netherlands, home births might be even safer. How can this be, since there is a
small, but irreducible, incidence of unpredictable complications that can only be
successfully corrected by immediate access to the facilities of a hospital? The reason may
be that there are different dangers of having a low-risk delivery in a hospital which are of a

similar magnitude to the risks of low-risk home birth. The relative risks of both settings
must be considered if overall safety is to be objectively compared.

Just as the medical community must own up to the fact that hospitals present some
risks not present in the home as a birth setting, home birth advocates must concede that

hospitalization does improve birth outcomes in known high risk cases. And indeed,its
advocates feel that home birth is to be encouraged only within specific safety guidelines.1
The fact that an infant may die at home that would not have died had it been bom in a

hospital does not establish as fact that hospital births are safer in all cases. Just so the fact

that an infant may die in a hospital that would not have died if bom at home does not verify
that home births are safer in all cases. Conditions such as the risk category of the
pregnancy matter, and we can make reasonable judgements of relative safety based on
them.

Likewise, there is good evidence to establish the competence and excellent safety
record of midwives and those who are non-interventionistic in their birth attendance
methods, granted certain conditions are met Those basic conditions are that the mother
and pregnancy be screened to determine that they are low-risk. To what can one
reasonably attribute the finding that home birth and midwife attended birth are not
statistically less safe than hospital and physician attended birth?

One explanation for this comparable safety might be the constant,individualized
attention of the caregiver. In home births and midwife attended births there are no shifts

and the participants remain the same from beginning to end. Such care is not generally
available in U.S. hospitals. Typically, the attention of both physicians and nurses is spread
over multiple individuals. It is reasonable to suggest that the longstanding prenatal
relationship of midwives with their clients engenders more confidence in the laboring
woman and a higher degree of interest and attentiveness by the caregiver than even the best

nurse or "on call" physician can generate with a virtual stranger in the course of one shift.

Furthermore,important facts often "fall through the cracks" at shift change.
Another factor which may,in part, account for good home birth and midwife

attended bulh outcomes is screening. Other than the formal screening for risk factors

which results in referrals to hospitals and obstetricians, there is an element of self-screening

in those who elect home or midwife attended births. Those who are afraid of home birth

will not usually attempt to deliver there. Only those who are highly motivated will usually
plan a home birth or midwife attended birth. This high level of motivation often leads to

important risk-lowering behaviors of self-education, attention to nutrition, physical
conditioning,frequent caregiver contacts, etc. One study has shown a remarkable degree
of such preparatory behaviors in those who choose home birth.2

A final factor which may also account, in part,for the safety profiles of the

childbirth alternatives discussed above is the difference in their use of techniques.
Technical intervention, as shown above, is remarkable in its life saving and morbidity
lowering ability when pathology arises, but it is by no means itself benign. It may not

improve outcomes, and in fact may give rise to iatrogenic complications and greater
morbidity and mortality, when indiscriminately applied where nature is functioning
normally.

Several common,significant obstetrical practices violate safety concepts based on

scientific studies accepted within orthodox medicine. Most of the criticisms of techniques
reviewed above are made by physicians, often leaders in their fields, based on clinical data

as well as the basic sciences of relevance to medicine: anatomy, physiology, microbiology,
pharmacology and human behavior. Examples of such practices include the lithotomy
position for delivery, the recumbent position for labor,frequent internal examinations,
casual amniotomy and pubic shaving. It would be difficult to defend these as routine

practices when considered by themselves. Other common practices which might be
appropriately challenged as to their general application in terms of risk-benefit ratio include

internal fetal monitoring and fasting during labor. Let us not forget that not everything
which is done in medicine is based on scientific proof that it is physiologically
advantageous. Many practices are frankly for convenience,cost control, or based on
theory or custom.

A comparison of the U.S. to the numerous countries which rank higher in statistical
perinatal safety despite their greater utilisation of childbirth alternatives such as midwives

and home births should compel us to re-evaluate our thinking on the safety of those
alternatives. Yet it is hard to demonstrate to eveiyone's satisfaction that those countries'

statistics are better because of those factors or despite them (and are really due to other
factors).

This observation leads us a final, general conclusion which can be drawn from the

factual portion of the preceding discussion: the factors which influence birth outcome are
many,and they are interrelated in complex ways. This makes assertions of the merits of

any one alternative difficult to prove. There is some direct data which supports the safety
of one childbirth alternative over another, but much indirect data which can be variously
interpreted.

There is a pressing need for more definitive, carefully controlled studies to directly
compare childbirth alternatives. Such studies are difficult to design. They cannot be

double blind and the strong attitudes and beliefs of those who are about to give birth makes
randomization difficult if not impossible. But there is a strong theoretical base and a great
deal of preliminary evidence to support the the idea that several alternatives to what has
become the typical U.S. childbirth experience are comparable in risk-benefit ratio.
Limiting parental access to childbirth options which cannot be shown to be less safe

than hospital based, physician attended birth, and yet are less expensive and may offer
other benefits, is morally unjustifiable. Neither is such limiting in the best interests of

society at large. Society at large does have an interest in birth outcomes, however. It bears

the financial and moral burden of infants who are adversely affected by birth practices. It
also has interests in preserving the freedom ofits citizens and maintaining the family unit as
the locus of role responsibility for children, though. But the state can positively influence

maternal and fetal health, and even save money at the same time, by several means without
significantly limiting these other two interests.

While I believe that most hospitals and physicians are sincere in their concern for

the best interests of mothers and infants in childbirth, the medical community should not be
expected to be completely objective in recommending how to achieve that end. Health care
providers are no more immune to pride, complacency and financial incentive and their

effects on objectivity than any other group in society, despite their conscious good
intentions. These problems do not lie merely with individuals either. There are faults in

the institutions of medicine, such as the educational process, and in the legal system, and in
social factors which have led to some objectively negative childbirth associated behaviors.

For these reasons, consumerism and the demand for objective evidence that certain

practices in modem obstetrics create more benefit than detriment is very appropriate. Such
confrontation has brought about much beneficial change in the last 20 years and stands to
promote more.

Following through with purely ethical considerations,I will now apply my
proposed theory of moral obligation, enlightened by some additional material. Let us first
recall that as a deontological theorist, I am not as concerned with the overall balance of

good as I am with the faithful discharge of duty. In the tradition of Ross,I propose that we
have prima facie duties to both mother and fetus. All other things being equal, we have a
duty to be beneficent to fetuses. All other things being equal, we have a duty to be
beneficent to mothers. And the first duty of beneficence is non-maleficence. So our first
duties are to do no harm to mothers and fetuses.

Let us recall my world view about the moral neutrality of nature and our inability to
take responsibiUty for its undesirable events. Continuing with the line of reasoning above,
let us apply it to the extreme case offorced cesarean sections. We see that we abrogate our
first duty to the mother if we operate against her will, and yet we do not abrogate this first

duty of non-maleficence to either the mother or the fetus if we respect her wishes. If this
reasoning applies to this extreme case, it surely applies to lesser cases of maternal-fetal

conflict during pregnancy. This observation about non-maleficence highlights the

discussion above about the natural inseparability of the mother and fetus during pregnancy
and the ramifications of that fact.

Consideration of non-maleficence and the passivity to our first duty which this may
seem to lead at times sheds light on the question "How can it be wrong for a mother to
deliver herself(or be delivered by a midwife) at home today when the same action could

not be construed in any way as immoral throughout the rest of history?" If we must
prevent harm (the second duty of beneficence) at the cost of doing positive harm (the first

duty of beneficence) then we have our priorities reversed. Of course, if a mother requests
intervention to aid her distressed fetus or to prevent fetal harm, we have not acted

malevolently to her or her fetus. Conversely, if a woman can be established as doing
positive harm to her third trimester fetus, we may then seek to intervene because of the
offsetting maleficence.

I strongly conclude, therefore, that with only two minor exceptions, we ought to
permit the childbearer herself to choose between the various childbirth alternatives without

fear of legal retribution or the contempt of medical professionals should she subsequently
seek their services. These minor exceptions would be cases of formally established
incompetence on the part of the childbearing woman,and demonstration that the woman is

doing positive harm (not allowing harm passively)to the fetus who possesses extra-uterine
viability. Even in the case of a woman actively abusing her fetus(which would be rare

because she can hardly do so without abusing herself), though she may be held liable,I
argue that we are still not compelled enough more by the interests of the fetus, as against
the interests of the mother, to justify invasion of her body against her will.

Admittedly,I argue from the point of view of one who places less absolute value on

fetuses than on their mothers. My concept ofjustice does not demand that they be treated

equally. I also argue from a deontological view in which beneficence is shaped by a strong
concept of autonomy. But even it one values fetuses above their mothers and takes the

utihtanan approach of recommending whatever actions would produce the greatest balance

of living infants over dead ones, many unorthodox childbirth alternatives might still be

justified (though different conclusions might be reached about the extent to which parents
should be allowed freedom of choice in the matter). The same would hold true if the

utilitarian goal were healthy infants, living mothers, or healthy family units.
Finally, I conclude that society as a whole would benefit from steps to increase the

availability of childbirth options. The lack of free competition not only increases the cost of

medical care, but more importantly, it decreases incentives to improve any of the options.
No childbirth alternative is without its drawbacks. Increasing consumer choice should

force refinement of the individual options as well as the health delivery system as a whole.
And lastly, more choice in this matter might increase the sense of consumer responsibility,
which might in turn mitigate against the present litigation crisis in obstetrical care.
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APPENDIX A

Birth Statistics by Attendant in Selected U.S. cities; 1914-1932

Midwives

Physicians

Neonatal Mortality Rate
Newark, N.J., 1915-1916

25.1/1,000

42.7/1,000

220/100,000

710/100,000

Newark, N.J., 1916-1921

150/100,000

690/100,000

Maternal Mortality Rate
Philadelphia, PA, 1914-1930

850/100,000

746/100,000

290/100,000

440/100,000

Maternal Mortality Rate
Newark, N.J., 1922

Maternal Mortality Rate

Maternal Mortality Rate
New York, N.Y., 1930-1932
Definitions:

The Neonatal Mortality Rate is the number of neonatal (from birth through 28 days of age)
deaths per 1,000 hve births.

The Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of maternal deaths that occur as the result of the
reproductive process per 100,000 live births.

Statistical data above is taken from References 12 and 13 of Chapter m and from Julius
Levy,"Maternal Morbidity and Mortality in the First Month of Life in Relation to
Attendant at Birth," American Tonmal

13(1923):88-95.
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APPENDIX B

Lowest Infant Mortality Rates by World Rank
1964*
Sweden
Netherlands

Norway
Finland
Iceland
Denmark
Switzerland
New Zealand
Australia

United Kingdom
Japan
Czechoslovakia
Ukrainian SSR
France
Taiwan
Scotland
Canada
United States

1977**
Sweden
Netherlands
Finland

Sweden

Japan

Japan

Denmark
Finland

Norway

Norway

Denmark
France
Switzerland
New Zealand
Australia
Canada

Netherlands
Switzerland
France

United Kingdom
East Germany
Ireland

Hong Kong
United States

Belgium

Singapore
Canada
Australia

German Democratic Rep.
Hong Kong
United Kingdom
United States
New Zealand

* ^formation from the Statistical Office of the United Nations, cited by Suzanne Arms
i" Imm^cylrne Deception,(New York: Bantam Books,Inc., 1975), pp. 43 and 46.
** ^formation from the Statistical Office of the United Nations, cited by M.E. Wegman
in "Annual Summary of Vital Statistics." Journal of Pediatrirs 64(December 1979):6.
The 1984 ranking of lowest Infant Mortality Rates(IMR)reported in USA Todav

(March 4, 1985, p. lOA)indicated that the United States continued to show a relatively
poor standing at 17th place. The United States' IMR for that year was quoted as 11.7
deaths per 1,000 live births. No table was given, but the IMR of several other countries

were cited for comparison: East Germany (11.4), United Kingdom (11.0), Spain (10.3),
Japan (6.6), and Finland (6.0).

